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ABSTRACT 
  One of the most impactful effects of climate change in recent years 
has been the increasing frequency and severity of natural disasters, even 
in geographic areas not previously known as disaster-prone. These 
disasters have caused untold property damage. Typically, the cost of 
rebuilding a home is assumed at least in part by private insurance 
companies, but many homeowners are significantly underinsured for 
disaster-related losses. Additionally, in areas where natural disasters 
are becoming increasingly frequent, private insurers have determined 
that it is no longer profitable to continually issue massive payouts 
without charging astronomical premiums, leaving many homeowners 
without access to financial relief. This Note argues that these 
circumstances call for a federal intervention. Specifically, it analogizes 
owning a disaster-prone home to having a preexisting health condition 
as defined by the Affordable Care Act. Using lessons from this analogy, 
this Note proposes a federal mandate requiring all homeowners to 
purchase natural disaster insurance and argues such a policy is 
achievable through Congress’s taxing power. Further, this Note argues 
that features of the proposed mandate, such as precaution crediting and 
a subsidized insurance program, render it superior to previously 
attempted regulation of natural disaster insurance. 
INTRODUCTION 
In fewer than four weeks during the 2020 fire season, almost 1.5 
million acres burned in California.1 Across this area, which is roughly 
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 1. Christopher Flavelle, Wildfires Hasten Another Climate Crisis: Homeowners Who Can’t 
Get Insurance, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/02/climate/wildfires-insurance.html 
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the size of Delaware, over ten thousand structures were damaged or 
destroyed.2 Many were homes, leaving families displaced and forced to 
spend years rebuilding at considerable expense.3 Total losses, 
measured in “direct costs,” for the year are estimated in the billions of 
dollars.4 Although wildfires have always threatened California, the past 
several years have seen an increase in their scale and intensity.5 Cities 
and towns that were once safe from wildfires have gone up in flames.6 
Thousands of homeowners are now responsible for the enormous 
 
[https://perma.cc/J2HA-RBFP] (last updated Sept. 10, 2020). The fire season typically lasts from 
June through September, although some scientists argue that there is a second, distinct fire season 
that lasts from October through April. Kendra Pierre-Louis & John Schwartz, Why Does 
California Have So Many Wildfires?, N.Y. TIMES, https://www.nytimes.com/article/why-does-
california-have-wildfires.html [https://perma.cc/X8BL-8E9H] (last updated July 16, 2021).  
 2. 2020 Incident Archive, CAL FIRE, https://www.fire.ca.gov/incidents/2020 [https://
perma.cc/3HHG-BJQK]. Delaware spans approximately 1,534,000 acres. Inventoried Roadless 
Area Acreage Categories of NFS Lands Summarized by State, U.S. FOREST SERV., https://
www.fs.usda.gov/Internet/FSE_DOCUMENTS/fsm8_037652.htm [https://perma.cc/Z5Z5-
PXQM].  
 3. See Jill Cowan, How Much Will the Wildfires Cost?, N.Y. TIMES, https://
www.nytimes.com/2020/09/16/us/california-fires-cost.html [https://perma.cc/Q6K5-FLCV] (last 
updated Oct. 16, 2020) (estimating “direct” losses due to wildfires may amount to over $20 billion 
in 2020 and “in three of the past four years, including this one, fires are on track to cause damages 
in excess of $10 billion”). There is a temporal lag in definitively calculating total losses due to 
wildfires, but a 2020 study determined that in 2018 alone, wildfires costed Californians $102.6 
billion, including $59.9 billion in direct capital costs and healthcare expenses. Full Cost of 
California’s Wildfires to the US Revealed, UNIV. COLL. LONDON NEWS, https://www.ucl.ac.uk/
news/2020/dec/full-cost-californias-wildfires-us-revealed [https://perma.cc/NM4R-6FBU] (last 
updated Dec. 7, 2020). At the individual level, Californians have also observed dramatic impacts 
on their median home values. In Butte County, the site of the Butte Fire, the median home value 
is $313,000, compared to $247,000 inside the fire boundary. Alcynna Lloyd, This Is How Much 
California’s Wildfires Could Cost Homeowners, HOUS. WIRE (Nov. 12, 2018, 12:06 PM), https://
www.housingwire.com/articles/47378-this-is-how-much-californias-wildfires-could-cost-
homeowners [https://perma.cc/76CR-3W2Y]. The impact can also move in the opposite direction; 
after the Camp Fire in Paradise, California, there was a deficit in remaining homes, causing their 
values to increase on average from $264,000 to $277,000. Deidre Woollard, How Have the 
California Wildfires Impacted the Local Real Estate Market?, MILLIONACRES, https://
www.millionacres.com/real-estate-investing/articles/how-have-the-california-wildfires-impacted-
the-local-real-estate-market [https://perma.cc/T8F3-RADS] (last updated Oct. 21, 2020).  
 4. Cowan, supra note 3. While 2020 cost figures remain estimations, concrete numbers from 
2018 put the total economic burden of wildfires in California that year at $148.5 billion. UNIV. 
COLL. LONDON NEWS, supra note 3 
 5. See Shu Li & Tirtha Banerjee, Spatial and Temporal Pattern of Wildfires in California 
from 2000 to 2019, SCI. REPS., Apr. 22, 2021, at 1, 3, 12 (“[T]he proportion of extreme wildfires 
larger than 10,000 acres (40.47 km2) has increased significantly in the last two decades.”). 
Additionally, the study found that “the frequency and total burned area of all wildfires have 
increased significantly.” Id. at 12. 
 6. Id.  
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financial burdens of losing their homes.7 And each year, the fires’ 
intensity and the resulting damage seem to be getting worse.8  
The culprit is climate change: rising global temperature resulting 
from anthropogenic activity exacerbates the magnitude and frequency 
of natural disasters.9 Natural disasters, once rare emergencies, are 
increasingly an integral facet of everyday life.10 The effects are 
nationwide; hurricanes make landfall more frequently in the East, 
tornadoes ravage the Midwest, and fires scorch much of the West.11 
Recovery can take years, and financial wreckage only compounds with 
each increasingly regular disaster.12 Insurance companies struggle to 
 
 7. Id.  
 8. See Cowan, supra note 3 (describing how annual losses due to wildfires on the West Coast 
have increased from an average of $1 billion per year to an expected $10 billion per year in recent 
years).  
 9. See generally JASON ANDERSON, INST. FOR EUR. ENV’T POL’Y, & CAMILLA BAUSCH, 
ECOLOGIC, CLIMATE CHANGE AND NATURAL DISASTERS: SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE OF A 
POSSIBLE RELATION BETWEEN RECENT NATURAL DISASTERS AND CLIMATE CHANGE 2 
(2006), https://ieep.eu/uploads/articles/attachments/ced7e1f4-36c3-4c83-805e-1227f3233f9d/IEEP_
Ecologic_climate_change_natural_disasters.pdf [https://perma.cc/78XU-CTQG] (documenting the 
relationship between increasing greenhouse gas emissions and more frequent extreme weather 
events, which notably exclude “forest fires in areas of drought” because they are considered 
“secondary” effects); DAVID FRANCIS, LANARK HOUSE COMMC’NS, & HENRY HENGEVELD, 
ENV’T CAN., EXTREME WEATHER AND CLIMATE CHANGE (1998), https://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/
viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.455.4963&rep=rep1&type=pdf [https://perma.cc/H7V3-9J4T] 
(reviewing the relationship between climate change and extreme weather); Peter Stott, How 
Climate Change Affects Extreme Weather Events, 352 SCIENCE 1517 (2016) (same). 
 10. See Sandra Banholzer, James Kossin & Simon Donner, The Impact of Climate Change 
on Natural Disasters, in REDUCING DISASTER: EARLY WARNING SYSTEMS FOR CLIMATE 
CHANGE 21, 43 (Ashbindu Singh & Zinta Zommers eds., 2014) (“With projected increases in 
intensity and frequency of extreme events due to climate change as well as increasing exposure 
and vulnerability of populations, impacts of natural hazards are most likely worsening.”); see also 
Number of Recorded Natural Disaster Events, All Natural Disasters, 1900 to 2019, OUR WORLD 
IN DATA, https://ourworldindata.org/grapher/number-of-natural-disaster-events [https://
perma.cc/Q7QW-QL5F] (displaying a chart showing the dramatic increase in the number of 
global natural disasters recorded over the last century).  
 11. Kat Eschner, The Most Dangerous Places To Live in America that Are Prone to Natural 
Disasters, CNBC, https://www.cnbc.com/2019/07/10/billion-dollar-natural-disasters-rising-these-
states-better-prepare.html [https://perma.cc/H89Y-TWLT] (last updated July 15, 2019, 9:34 AM); 
see also Carolyn Kousky, Informing Climate Adaptation: A Review of the Economic Costs of 
Natural Disasters, Their Determinants, and Risk Reduction Options, 46 ENERGY ECON. 576, 581 
(2014) (displaying a chart showing the increased economic toll of natural disasters between 2000 
and 2019, which can serve as a proxy for disasters’ heightened impact in recent years). 
 12. See UNITED NATIONS OFF. FOR DISASTER RISK REDUCTION, GLOBAL ASSESSMENT 
REPORT ON DISASTER RISK REDUCTION: REVEALING RISK, REDEFINING DEVELOPMENT 
SUMMARY AND MAIN FINDINGS 6 (2011), https://www.preventionweb.net/english/hyogo/gar/
2011/en/bgdocs/GAR-2011/GAR2011_ES_English.pdf [https://perma.cc/TN9A-XC4A] (“[T]he 
extensive risks of today can become the intensive risks of tomorrow when they accumulate in 
places exposed to major hazards . . . .”). For an example of how lengthy recovery can be, one need 
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respond, as the demand for financial relief exceeds the rate at which 
they can fulfill payouts.13 
For homeowners, the stakes have never been higher. In 2018 
alone, the U.S. government and U.S. residents collectively suffered $91 
billion in losses related to natural disasters.14 Further, in a report from 
CoreLogic that identified millions of homes considered high risk for 
natural disasters, researchers found these homeowners were 
collectively underinsured against those losses by tens of millions of 
dollars.15  
This plight is similar to that of the forty-six million nonelderly 
individuals without health insurance prior to the passage of the Patient 
Protection and Affordable Care Act (“ACA”).16 The ACA reduced 
this number by half,17 saving millions of U.S. residents from potential 
permanent financial ruin due to being under- or uninsured.18 Likewise, 
to save a large and growing number of U.S. residents from financial 
ruin due to natural disasters, the federal government should intervene 
in the homeowner insurance market in a way comparable to the ACA.  
 
look no further than the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina—over a decade after the event, New 
Orleans communities continue to struggle. Nicolette Santos, Fourteen Years Later, New Orleans 
Is Still Trying To Recover from Hurricane Katrina, ENV’T & ENERGY STUDY INST. (Apr. 26, 
2019), https://www.eesi.org/articles/view/fourteen-years-later-new-orleans-is-still-trying-to-recover-
from-hurricane-katrina [https://perma.cc/E7MB-66R3].  
 13. See, e.g., Flavelle, supra note 1 (“Years of megafires have caused huge losses for 
insurance companies . . . .”).  
 14. Diana Olick, Millions of Homes Are Underinsured Against Natural Disasters as 
Construction Costs Keep Rising, CNBC, https://www.cnbc.com/2019/05/03/millions-of-homes-are-
underinsured-against-natural-disasters.html [https://perma.cc/B5X4-XD3X] (last updated May 
17, 2019, 4:20 PM). Olick cites to the National Oceanic and Atmospheric Association, which 
calculated “total costs” as “costs in terms of dollars that would not have been incurred had the 
event not taken place.” See Overview, NAT’L OCEANIC & ATMOSPHERIC ASS’N: BILLION-
DOLLAR WEATHER & CLIMATE DISASTERS, https://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/billions/overview 
[https://perma.cc/2AJE-G8M9].  
 15. FRANK NOTHAFT, AMY GROMOWSKI, ANNETTE TIERNEY, DENISE MOORE & GUY 
KOPPERUD, CORELOGIC, 2019 INSURANCE COVERAGE ADEQUACY REPORT: THE EFFECTS OF 
UNDERINSURANCE TO THE PROPERTY ECOSYSTEM 4–7 (2019), https://www.corelogic.com/wp-
content/uploads/sites/4/downloadable-docs/2019-insurance-coverage-adequacy-report-0419-06-
screen.pdf [https://perma.cc/J4TL-HQT4]. 
 16. Jennifer Tolbert, Kendal Orgera & Anthony Damico, Key Facts About the Uninsured 
Population, KAISER FAM. FOUND. (Nov. 6, 2020), https://www.kff.org/uninsured/issue-brief/key-
facts-about-the-uninsured-population [https://perma.cc/N6E3-S37N]. 
 17. See id. (“The number of uninsured nonelderly individuals dropped from more than 46.5 
million in 2010 to fewer than 26.7 million in 2016 before climbing to 28.9 million individuals in 
2019.”). 
 18. See discussion infra Part II.A (justifying the need for federal intervention into the 
property insurance market).  
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Yet, the solution should not be to have state governments forcibly 
relocate those living in disaster-prone regions. In fact, relocation is 
often impossible,19 such as in the case of the statewide housing shortage 
facing California.20 Even outside of California, increased mass 
relocation will inevitably drive price hikes for real estate in the lower 
risk destination regions.21 Relocation is also impracticable from an 
environmental justice perspective, as it is based on the presumptions 
that, first, those living in disaster-prone regions can leave and, second, 
historical and systemic reasons do not impede their opportunities to 
retreat.22 As a result, forced relocation perpetuates cycles of poverty 
and abandonment,23 whereas a new insurance regime presents the 
opportunity to bring newfound stability to disaster-prone communities. 
In other words, limiting forced relocation by providing access to 
insurance alleviates environmental justice concerns by empowering 
individuals to choose where they live.24 The most effective rewritten 
insurance regulations will be those that include plans for long-term 
resiliency in the face of natural disasters, reducing the need for 
constant rebuilding.25  
 
 19. See John Schwartz, After a Natural Disaster, Is It Better To Rebuild or Retreat?, N.Y. 
TIMES (Dec. 13, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/12/13/us/after-a-natural-disaster-is-it-
better-to-rebuild-or-retreat.html [https://perma.cc/NS7Q-WEC5] (“[S]imply saying that people 
should not live in a place ignores reality . . . .”). 
 20. Flavelle, supra note 1. 
 21. See Leah Platt Boustan, Maria Lucia Yanguas, Matthew Kahn & Paul W. Rhode, As the 
Rich Move Away from Disaster Zones, the Poor Are Left Behind, GRIST (July 1, 2017), https://
grist.org/article/as-the-rich-move-away-from-disaster-zones-the-poor-are-left-behind [https://
perma.cc/SB9N-F7EN] (“[P]eople move away from areas hit by the largest natural disasters . . . . 
[I]f a county experienced two natural disasters, migration out of that county increased by one 
percentage point . . . .”). Migration impacting housing prices is unsurprising, as “[p]ositive or 
negative migration into a geographic area will have a dramatic impact on housing supply and 
demand.” Brad Cartier, Housing Market Supply and Demand, MILLIONACRES, https://
www.millionacres.com/real-estate-basics/real-estate-terms/housing-market-supply-and-demand 
[https://perma.cc/ABX5-5BYS] (last updated June 17, 2021). 
 22. See infra Part I.A. 
 23. See Doug Donovan, Poor Families Must Move Often, but Rarely Escape Concentrated 
Poverty, HUB (Oct. 8, 2020), https://hub.jhu.edu/2020/10/08/stefanie-deluca-crises-force-families-
to-move-frequently [https://perma.cc/2D39-WFHZ] (“[L]ow-income families are forced by 
urgent crises to choose the safest, most convenient locations necessary for immediate survival 
rather than take the time to find neighborhoods with great schools and job opportunities.”).  
 24. See discussion infra Part II.C (modeling a federal intervention whereby the federal 
government is able to provide financial support for rebuilding by mandating disaster insurance 
nationwide).  
 25. See Flavelle, supra note 1 (describing consumer groups’ and the state’s rationales for 
advocating for rewards based on risk mitigation).  
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Federal intervention into property insurance markets is not 
unprecedented. The federal government has multiple models upon 
which to draw for this initiative. The accomplishments and 
shortcomings of two such interventions are particularly informative. 
First, the Hurricane Katrina Recovery, Reclamation, Restoration, 
Reconstruction and Reunion Act of 2005 would have, if enacted, 
permitted individuals impacted by Hurricane Katrina to retroactively 
draw into the federal government’s national flood insurance program.26 
This emergency approach would have been coupled with efforts at the 
state level; in Louisiana, for example, the state government did stop 
the clock on prescriptive periods, buying more time for the 
homeowners to file claims.27 As will be discussed in Part I, this effort 
proved inadequate in the aftermath of what was, at the time, the most 
devastating natural disaster in U.S. history.28 The lesson remains clear: 
issuing emergency legislation during an ongoing crisis will not be 
enough to meet the needs of those harmed.29 Federal intervention 
during Hurricane Katrina thus demonstrates the pitfalls of a reactive, 
as opposed to prevention-based, approach to intervention.30 
 
 26. Hurricane Katrina Recovery, Reclamation, Restoration, Reconstruction and Reunion 
Act of 2005, H.R. 4197, 109th Cong. (2005); see National Flood Insurance Act of 1968, Pub. L. 
No. 90-448, 82 Stat. 572 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4001–4129) (establishing a national 
flood insurance program). 
 27. La. Exec. Order KBB 2005-67, 31 La. Reg. 2675, 2676 (Nov. 20, 2005); see also State v. 
All Prop. & Cas. Ins. Carriers Authorized & Licensed To Do Bus., 937 So. 2d 313, 316, 327 (La. 
2006) (describing the order).  
 28. See Sarah Gibbens, Hurricane Katrina, Explained, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (Jan. 16, 2019), 
https://www.nationalgeographic.com/environment/article/hurricane-katrina [https://perma.cc/
TRR3-CMQA] (“Because of the ensuing destruction and loss of life, the storm is often considered 
one of the worst in U.S. history.”). 
 29. See Donald C. Menzel, The Katrina Aftermath: A Failure of Federalism or Leadership?, 
66 PUB. ADMIN. REV. 808, 810 (2006); see also FRANCES FRAGOS TOWNSEND, THE FEDERAL 
RESPONSE TO HURRICANE KATRINA: LESSONS LEARNED (2006), https://georgewbush-
whitehouse.archives.gov/reports/katrina-lessons-learned/chapter5.html [https://perma.cc/QCF9-
GM37] (describing an emergency response rife with inefficacies, lack of coordination between 
federal and local government, and communication breakdowns as contributing to the exacerbated 
toll Hurricane Katrina exacted upon U.S. residents).  
 30. See Mary Helen Stoltz, Flood Damage After Katrina Could Have Been Prevented, S&T 
Expert Says, MO. S&T (Aug. 24, 2015), https://news.mst.edu/2015/08/flood-damage-after-katrina-
could-have-been-prevented-st-expert-says [https://perma.cc/ZL8T-5GWK] (“[E]xperts say the 
flooding that caused over 1,800 deaths and billions of dollars in property damage could have been 
prevented had the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers retained an external review board to double-
check its flood-wall designs.”); TOWNSEND, supra note 29 (enumerating the ways in which lack of 
preparedness and the coordinated response systems in place led to further harm).  
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Further, the federal government should look to the ACA’s 
treatment of preexisting conditions31 as a compelling analog for 
addressing disaster-prone locations. The preexisting conditions 
provisions faced powerful adversaries that predate their inception32: 
individualism and capitalism, considered by some to be core U.S. 
values, arguably conflict with the notion of public responsibility for the 
ill.33 The ACA transformed this dialogue to a certain extent, promoting 
a notion of social responsibility now embedded in the fabric of the 
conversations surrounding healthcare reform.34 There is much to learn 
from this development, as the federal government must once again 
make the case for public responsibility—now for homes at risk of 
devastation by natural disasters.35 
Although both the Hurricane Katrina and ACA federal 
interventions could have been more effective, there is much to gain by 
analyzing their origins, motivations, implementation, and outcomes in 
the context of climate change’s pressing threat to the insurance and 
housing markets.36 This Note lays the foundation for such an analysis. 
More specifically, it argues for a new model of federal intervention, 
one that optimizes maximal coverage and risk prevention at minimal 
premiums. This new model will create a permanent infrastructure 
whereby the federal government subsidizes much of the costs incurred 
through natural disasters as an assumption of public responsibility. 
This intervention is not limited to property losses37 caused by wildfires; 
instead, it will encompass all disaster-related losses so that the 
 
 31. See 42 U.S.C. § 18001(a), (d) (providing immediate access to insurance for uninsured 
individuals with preexisting conditions).  
 32. Simon F. Haeder, How Pre-Existing Conditions Became Front and Center in Health 
Care Vote, CONVERSATION (May 4, 2017, 9:26 PM), https://theconversation.com/how-pre-
existing-conditions-became-front-and-center-in-health-care-vote-77138 [https://perma.cc/L4SZ-
NGA9]. 
 33. See generally Martin McKee & David Stuckler, The Crisis of Capitalism and the 
Marketisation of Health Care: The Implications for Public Health Professionals, 1 J. PUB. HEALTH 
RSCH. 236 (2012) (describing “a [healthcare] system that is managed not for the benefit of the 
people but rather for the corporations and the small elite who lead them”). 
 34. See, e.g., Will Stone, More than Politics on the Line for Voters with Preexisting Conditions, 
NPR (Nov. 2, 2020, 5:08 PM), https://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2020/11/02/928237198/
more-than-politics-on-the-line-for-voters-with-pre-existing-conditions [https://perma.cc/3H4S-
SBBT] (describing how protections for those with preexisting conditions are now overwhelmingly 
supported by individuals in the United States). 
 35. See infra Part II.C. 
 36. See, e.g., Flavelle, supra note 1 (describing how the increasing severity of wildfires is 
intensifying crises in the insurance market and, consequently, in the real estate market). 
 37. Throughout this Note, “losses” refers to property losses and damages, unless otherwise 
specified. 
O'HARA IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 12/23/2021  9:45 AM 
950  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 71:943 
government may properly benefit from a nationwide distribution of 
risk as an insurance provider. 
Part I introduces insurance generally, discussing how it functions 
and why the risk analysis specifically related to disaster insurance is 
inextricably linked to environmental justice. This Part then focuses on 
current challenges in the California state legislature, demonstrating 
that pressing issues in the homeowner insurance market are far from 
historically isolated challenges. Exploring the emergency legislation 
following Hurricane Katrina and the preexisting conditions provisions 
of the ACA, this Part finally contextualizes the later discussion of how 
the United States has failed to respond to insurance crises in the past 
and what should be achieved in the future.  
Part II accomplishes three objectives. First, it discusses the public 
policies underlying functional insurance services. Second, it addresses 
key constitutional questions related to the federal government’s right 
to intervene in state homeowner insurance markets. Third, it proposes 
the optimal structure for a federal intervention in the homeowner 
insurance market. This final Section concludes with a permanent 
federal intervention mandating disaster insurance via a tax on property 
mortgages. Such a tax will facilitate the use of nationwide risk 
corridors, ultimately reducing the financial burdens associated with 
natural disasters for homeowners, insurance companies, and states 
alike.  
I.  FIRES, FLOODS, AND FEDERAL INTERVENTION: GOVERNMENTS 
AS INSURERS 
This Part first lays a foundation for how insurance functions in the 
United States and then characterizes the precise nature and scope of 
the existing challenges within the homeowner insurance market, 
focusing on the current issues in the California State Legislature. Next, 
it offers a detailed treatment of two imperfect models of federal 
intervention: the reactive legislation following Hurricane Katrina and 
the preexisting conditions provisions of the ACA. This Part discusses 
the origins of these interventions, their interactions with state 
legislation, and where they could have been more effective. This Part 
ultimately demonstrates both that legislation targeting only high-risk 
individuals can merely scratch the surface of harm reduction and that 
piecemeal, state-by-state programming will result in undue burdens on 
select state governments, which would otherwise be eliminated 
through federal intervention.  
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A. A Primer on Insurance and the Infeasibility of Relocation 
Insurance companies are tasked with determining the most cost-
effective way to distribute estimated risks and still generate a profit.38 
To do so, they first estimate the risk of loss associated with what the 
customer—here, a homeowner—is insuring—here, a home.39 Then, 
using an algorithm, they calculate a premium, which is the amount 
charged to the insured that is used by the insurer to pay for the losses 
covered by the insurance policy.40 Often, there is a protection gap—the 
estimated replacement cost is significantly lower than the actual cost of 
covering the loss.41 An underinsured homeowner may be left to pay the 
difference, although legal remedies against the insurer exist in the 
event of either a bad faith act of malpractice or fraud.42 Any liability 
the insurance company assumes is typically a cost of business.43 
Problematically, even though the insurance company estimates the 
risk, it is the homeowner who may be responsible for individual losses 
if this estimate is wrong.44 This is not to say the insurance company is 
immune from the consequences of such errors; software programs may 
fail to take into account demand surges (such as in the wake of natural 
disasters), leading to underinsurance.45 But unlike the homeowner, the 
insurance company has strategies in place for offloading this risk.46 The 
 
 38. See Romona Paden, The Ins and Outs of Risk Assessment, COVERAGE (Oct. 7, 2020), 
https://www.coverage.com/insurance/auto/the-ins-and-outs-of-risk-assessment [https://perma.cc/
GR5Q-5BPU] (“The goal, of course, is to strike a balance between an insurer’s profitability and 
potential claims by policyholders.”). 
 39. Id.  
 40. Id.; Julia Kagan, Insurance Premium, INVESTOPEDIA (Sept. 10, 2021), https://
www.investopedia.com/terms/i/insurance-premium.asp [https://perma.cc/YY9K-BGC5]. 
 41. See Kenneth S. Klein, Minding the Protection Gap: Resolving Unintended, Pervasive, 
Profound Homeowner Underinsurance, 25 CONN. INS. L.J. 34, 35, 37 n.2 (2018) (defining the 
protection gap as “the difference between the coverage limits in a homeowner policy . . . and . . . 
the actual cost to replace” the “lost dwelling”).  
 42. See Douglas R. Richmond, An Overview of Insurance Bad Faith Law and Litigation, 25 
SETON HALL L. REV. 74, 78, 96–103 (1994) (explaining that an insured individual may seek tort 
damages when their insurer violates its duty of good faith and defining bad faith).  
 43. See Klein, supra note 41, at 98–104 (describing how insurers profit by underinsuring).  
 44. See id. at 100 (“Policyholders think they are buying truly full replacement coverage while 
insurers know the likelihood that the coverage limits could be inadequate.”).  
 45. See id. at 64–77 (documenting the problems with insurance companies’ cost-estimating 
software and how chronic underestimations accrete into larger challenges).  
 46. See id. at 98 (“[B]ecause the legal landscape protects insurers from the consequence of 
inadequate coverage, the aspects of cost estimating that result in nominally full but actually 
inadequate coverage turn out to be features rather than glitches.”). In other words, insurance 
regulations have created a moral hazard wherein an insurer generates profit from the 
underinsurance of its customers. Id. at 98–99. 
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legal landscape favors insurers who underinsure, and what’s more, an 
insurance company is able to distribute, or pool, its risk across all of its 
customers, such that the risks of miscalculations are, on average, 
generally offset.47 As will be discussed later in this Note, the same 
principles of risk offloading may benefit the U.S. government as an 
insurer. 
The resulting protection gap—impacting those whom insurers find 
too risky to insure—is a reality for both property and health insurance, 
but consequences vary between these two policy types. Historically, 
using a disaster insurance policy was likely to be a once-in-a-lifetime 
occurrence entirely outside of an individual’s control.48 Medical 
expenses, on the other hand, despite being moderately controlled 
through routine care, were likely to occur more frequently.49 
Additionally, although adverse health outcomes have only been 
subject to relatively minor unevenness in geographic distribution, 
individuals rightfully associate natural disasters with harm in discrete 
areas.50 Importantly, however, climate change renders these 
distinctions increasingly less salient insofar as more homeowners must 
now routinely dip into their coverage plans, as evinced by the situation 
in California.51 As the gap between frequency of use narrows for the 
two insurance services, the inability for traditional homeowner 
 
 47. Id. at 98; see also id. at 101 n.313 (“The premise of insurance is risk-spreading among the 
pool of insureds . . . .”). 
 48. See supra note 10 and accompanying text.  
 49. See HEALTH CARE COST INST., 2018 HEALTH CARE COST AND UTILIZATION REPORT 
(2020), https://healthcostinstitute.org/annual-reports/2020-02-13-18-20-19 [https://perma.cc/
5WCK-E76X] (finding that the average individual in the United States incurred $5,892 in medical 
and pharmacy costs in 2018).  
 50. While the geographic distribution of health outcomes is fairly even relative to that of 
natural disasters, economic inequalities and environmental injustices can drive health disparities 
along geographic lines. See generally Thomas C. Ricketts, III, Geography and Disparities in Health 
Care, in GUIDANCE FOR THE NATIONAL HEALTHCARE DISPARITIES REPORT 149 (Elaine K. 
Swift ed., 2002) (chronicling metrics of national healthcare disparities). 
 51. Flavelle, supra note 1. This Note does not suggest that utilizing disaster insurance and 
health insurance would occur at the same frequency, as an individual may make use of their health 
insurance policy on a monthly or even more frequent basis. But the two forms of insurance are 
beginning to converge on the matter of regularity, which is a function of the frequency of natural 
disasters increasing, albeit still on a different scale.  
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insurance52 plans to deal with routine payouts starkly contrasts the 
progress made to improve coverage in the health insurance arena.53  
In insurance, the balancing act is delicate: insurance companies 
aim to set premiums low enough to maximize the number of low-risk 
customers who decide to enroll to offset the costs associated with high-
risk customers, who are more likely to enroll themselves.54 Insurance 
companies then try to set rate premiums high enough to cover expenses 
as they arise, but low enough that individuals are not deterred from 
enrolling.55 In the wake of increasing natural disasters, however, this 
delicate balance comes under severe pressure.56 The number of high-
risk homes has increased at a rate faster than insurance companies can 
afford without effectuating large rate increases, which consumers 
cannot afford.57 At an impasse, insurance companies are often left with 
only one option: to not insure homes located in disaster-prone areas.58 
In California, this has led to an insurance availability crisis, an 
unwelcome challenge in a state already plagued by an affordable 
housing shortage.59 Worse, the majority of mortgage providers 
currently only provide loans that are contingent upon homeowners 
obtaining homeowner insurance; so if insurance companies abandon a 
regional market, buyers cannot finance the purchase of their homes.60 
Insurance companies are businesses. As a result, if they cannot sustain 
 
 52. This Note opts to use the phrase “homeowner insurance” in keeping with other scholarly 
works. See, e.g., Klein, supra note 41, at 37 n.1 (“There is a lack of agreement regarding whether 
the correct generic titling of standard insurance covering the loss of a residence is ‘homeowners,’ 
‘homeowner’s,’ ‘homeowners’,’ or ‘homeowner’ insurance. This Article adopts the later 
convention—‘homeowner.’”).  
 53. Compare infra Part I.D (describing the creation of the ACA and resulting progress), with 
Flavelle, supra note 1 (describing insurers’ struggle to make payouts, resulting in market 
pullouts).  
 54. See, e.g., SARA E. WILENSKY & JOEL B. TEITELBAUM, ESSENTIALS OF HEALTH POLICY 
AND LAW 158 (Richard Riegelman ed., 4th ed. 2020) (explaining that insurers want to set low 
premiums to attract low-risk customers in order to help pay for the high-risk customers who know 
they are likely to need the insurance and are therefore less cost motivated). 
 55. See id. (noting that insurance companies try “to charge lower premiums to attract healthy 
individuals who are less likely to use their benefits, and higher premiums to unhealthy individuals 
who are more likely to need medical care”).  
 56. Flavelle, supra note 1. 
 57. See id. (“[M]any insurance companies say their premiums are now set too low to cover 
the growing losses,” but that increasing premiums would “squeez[e] homeowners.”).  
 58. Id.  
 59. Id. 
 60. Pat Howard, How Much Homeowners Insurance Is Required by Mortgage Lenders?, 
POL’Y GENIUS, https://www.policygenius.com/homeowners-insurance/mortgage-lender-requirements-
for-homeowners-insurance [https://perma.cc/2W37-EQ4Y] (last updated Jan. 12, 2021).  
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profit margins in a given region, they have no reason to risk 
bankrupting themselves to the benefit of would-be homeowners or 
mortgage providers—thus, pulling out of an entire market is fully 
within insurers’ purview.  
Many have a knee-jerk reaction to this complex problem: people 
should simply relocate away from disaster-prone areas. Rebuilding 
over and over again in the same vulnerable region burdens the state 
and national economy, and, in regions where rebuilding is becoming 
increasingly regular, residents should similarly abandon the premises 
for less vulnerable areas.61 But this relocation argument is stymied by 
the fact that vulnerable regions are occupied largely by low-income 
individuals and families, many of whom are people of color and 
immigrants.62 These demographics are not random. When wealthier 
individuals abandon fraught landscapes for greener pastures, the 
market responds—prices soar in more climate-insulated destinations 
and plunge where environmental hazards are an imminent threat, 
prompting members of poor communities to occupy the most 
vulnerable lands.63  
To the extent governments consistently fail to ensure economic 
equality and access to subsidized housing,64 expecting swaths of people 
to come up with the funds to buy into neighborhoods they cannot 
afford is a misguided response. Furthermore, as previously discussed, 
climate change is a problem that is ever increasing in scale and scope, 
so the number of regions impacted by disaster is only going to rise.65 It 
is now mistaken to assume a community’s status as “safe” is a steady 
condition. If the vast majority of the country will one day be 
 
 61. See Christopher Flavelle, U.S. Flood Strategy Shifts to ‘Unavoidable’ Relocation of Entire 
Neighborhoods, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 26, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/08/26/climate/
flooding-relocation-managed-retreat.html [https://perma.cc/Q47D-ZQGB] (discussing increased 
efforts to “relocat[e] entire communities away from vulnerable areas . . . . amid acceptance that 
rebuilding over and over after successive floods makes little sense”).  
 62. See Renee Cho, Why Climate Change Is an Environmental Justice Issue, STATE OF THE 
PLANET (Sept. 22, 2020), https://news.climate.columbia.edu/2020/09/22/climate-change-
environmental-justice [https://perma.cc/SWT4-U4E9] (“[T]hese more vulnerable communities 
are largely the communities of color, immigrants, low-income communities and people for whom 
English is not their native language.”). See generally Helen Adams, Why Populations Persist: 
Mobility, Place Attachment and Climate Change, 37 POPULATION & ENV’T 429 (2016) (explaining 
how resource limitations contribute to communities’ elections to remain in vulnerable areas).  
 63. Boustan et al., supra note 21.  
 64. See The Problem, NAT’L LOW INCOME HOUS. COAL., https://nlihc.org/explore-issues/
why-we-care/problem [https://perma.cc/NUR3-E2S2] (providing national data regarding the 
housing shortage, homelessness, housing poverty, and underfunded programs). 
 65. See supra notes 9–11 and accompanying text.  
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geographically vulnerable in one way or another, there will eventually 
be nowhere to relocate. Instead, the government should adapt its 
policies based on where people already live—for both those who live 
there by choice and those who live there by circumstance.  
B. As California Burns, All Eyes on the State Legislature 
States, it seems, are unable to address disaster insurance crises on 
their own.66 Insurance regulation differs among states. California’s 
state government, for example, has struggled to implement regulations 
that simultaneously protect residents and their homes while also 
maintaining a market in which insurance companies can feasibly turn a 
profit.67 Further, the growing intensity and severity of fires in California 
have exposed key pitfalls of its regulatory scheme. Most pointedly, the 
California state government’s failure to reach a sustainable legislative 
compromise on how best to insure its at-risk homes demonstrates the 
need for federal support.68  
The California Insurance Regulations, which are promulgated by 
the California Department of Insurance, are famously consumer 
friendly.69 If an insurance company operating in California tries to 
increase rates for customers, the state is authorized “to reject or 
 
 66. See, e.g., Flavelle, supra note 1 (describing insurance company pullouts in California and 
the insufficiency of the state’s “high-risk insurance program”). Other states have observed 
distinct, but related insurance problems. In New Jersey, for example, insurance companies are 
wrestling with the threat of rising sea levels. Joe Martucci & Victoria Bouloubasis, In Atlantic 
City, Rising Seas Threaten an Already Struggling Industry, PRESS OF ATL. CITY (July 12, 2021), 
https://pressofatlanticcity.com/news/local/in-atlantic-city-rising-seas-threaten-an-already-struggling-
industry/article_6c9591a8-d371-11eb-a136-03277727293c.html [https://perma.cc/DJ88-96LR]. The 
South is similarly locked in a battle over who will pay for damages resulting from a barrage of 
natural disasters. See, e.g., Sofia Sokolove, Emily Wax-Thibodeaux, Mark Berman & Griff Witte, 
Billions in Damage Across the South Prompts Focus on Who’s To Blame, and Who Will Pay, 
WASH. POST (Feb. 19, 2021, 8:31 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/national/texas-winter-
storm-recovery/2021/02/19/2e30d20e-72ed-11eb-a4eb-44012a612cf9_story.html [https://perma.cc/
P7P5-7HBG] (noting that “the focus . . . rapidly shift[ed] to who would pay” following a week of 
storms across the South).  
 67. See infra notes 81–94 (describing political turmoil resulting from clashes between 
insurance companies and consumer protection groups in the state).  
 68. See infra notes 89–93 (noting the collapse of proposed legislative compromises); see also 
infra Part II.C (advocating for a federal intervention based in part on the inability of any other 
party, including the state, to resolve the crisis). 
 69. Flavelle, supra note 1; see also CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 10, § 5 (2021) (outlining the duties 
of the insurance commissioner and the regulations pertaining to insurers, such as those limiting 
insurers’ flexibility in rate-setting).  
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reduce” these proposed rate increases.70 Generally, this system of 
regulations is effective at preventing runaway rate increases, thereby 
keeping insurance accessible for the maximal number of Californians.71 
Earthquake insurance shows how these laws work. Until recent years, 
many were more likely to associate California with earthquakes than 
wildfires.72 Yet, standard homeowner insurance packages do not cover 
losses due to earthquakes in California.73 Homeowners may purchase 
earthquake insurance through any insurance company that is 
registered with the California Earthquake Authority.74 Even though 
standard homeowner insurance is required for obtaining a mortgage, 
earthquake insurance is not required in the state.75  
Though the earthquake insurance approach has generally 
garnered public support,76 key distinguishing factors between 
earthquakes and wildfires render this approach too weak a response to 
the latter. Serious earthquakes do not occur nearly as frequently as 
fires do in the state,77 so one could infer earthquakes are responsible 
for far less residential property damage in a given year. Additionally, 
with regard to earthquakes, California has taken several prophylactic 
 
 70. Flavelle, supra note 1; see also CAL. CODE REGS. tit. 10, § 2644.1 (2021) (“If the rate or 
proposed rate is excessive, the Commissioner shall indicate the highest rate that would not be 
excessive, which the insurer may adopt by amendment to its application, or the Commissioner 
shall reject the rate in its entirety.”).  
 71. See Flavelle, supra note 1 (noting California’s “[insurance] rules were designed to guard 
against higher rates”). While the consumer-friendly insurance market in California is presently 
beneficial to its residents, the increasing threat of natural disasters may make it difficult for 
insurance companies to fund payouts under existing rate constraints—hence the potential for 
inaccessible insurance in the long term. Id.  
 72. See Main Types of Disasters and Associated Trends, LEGIS. ANALYST’S OFF. (Jan. 10, 
2019), https://lao.ca.gov/Publications/Report/3918 [https://perma.cc/DXF9-QX6Z] (noting that, 
although “earthquakes can be some of the most destructive types of disasters” when they occur 
in California, earthquakes “occur[] less frequently than . . . fires,” and fires have “increase[d] in 
severity and frequency” in recent decades).  
 73. Earthquake Insurance, CAL. DEP’T OF INS., http://www.insurance.ca.gov/01-consumers/
105-type/95-guides/03-res/eq-ins.cfm [https://perma.cc/D3N4-W9FQ].  
 74. Id.  
 75. Id. 
 76. See David C. Marlett & Carl Pacini, Insurer Stock Price Responses to the Creation of the 
California Earthquake Authority, 18 J. INS. REGUL. 80, 99 (1999) (finding a positive relationship 
between stock prices for insurance companies and positive press about the California Earthquake 
Authority).  
 77. LEGIS. ANALYST’S OFF., supra note 72. To clarify, earthquakes still have potential to 
cause a significant amount of property damage, see id. (describing earthquakes as “destructive”), 
despite their lesser frequency—but, in a typical recent year, more residential property damage 
can be attributed to fires than earthquakes simply because more fires occur in a typical recent 
year than earthquakes. 
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measures to “earthquake-proof” existing structures, moderately 
increasing resiliency to even high-magnitude earthquakes and 
decreasing risks for homeowners.78 No preventative measures 
currently in place have proved much of a match for wildfires.79 Even 
Governor Gavin Newsom’s $536 million spending proposal—which 
was intended for a host of preventative measures such as managing 
vegetation, revaluating structures for fire safety, and improving 
training for firefighters—has been critiqued as “unlikely to be enough 
to manage even 1 million acres of threatened lands in the year to come, 
with at least 10 million acres across California requiring fire prevention 
treatments.”80 
Thus, although an opt-in system is feasible in the context of 
earthquake insurance, the nature of the wildfire crisis demands a 
different approach. Hundreds of structures are damaged by fires every 
year in California.81 Insurance companies, now faced with huge 
payouts, cannot feasibly turn a profit without raising their rates—
something California’s legislature greatly inhibits.82 With no 
conceivable strategy for staving off bankruptcy, insurance companies 
are forced to abandon entire zip codes, resulting in an insurance 
availability crisis that leads to both banks denying mortgages to 
 
 78. See The Field Act, CAL. EDUC. CODE § 17280.5 (West 2021) (establishing a committee 
to “determine whether a building . . . meets, or can be retrofitted to meet, . . . pupil safety 
performance standard[s]”); see also The Riley Act, CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE § 19163 (West 
2021) (establishing building requirements related to seismic safety). While California has made 
strides in seismic engineering, earthquake-proofing in the United States still severely lags behind 
the practice in other countries, such as Japan. See Thomas Fuller, Anjali Singhvi, Mika Gröndahl 
& Derek Watkins, Buildings Can Be Designed To Withstand Earthquakes. Why Doesn’t the U.S. 
Build More of Them?, N.Y. TIMES (June 7, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/interactive/2019/06/
03/us/earthquake-preparedness-usa-japan.html [https://perma.cc/6X95-QBET] (describing the 
political and economic barriers to achieving optimal earthquake-proofing in the United States as 
compared to in countries like Japan, which have enacted stricter standards).  
 79. Dale Kasler & Ryan Sabalow, Why California Spends Billions but Can’t Control Its 
Wildfires. ‘No Simple or Cheap Solution’, SACRAMENTO BEE, https://www.sacbee.com/news/
california/fires/article245250275.html [https://perma.cc/AR4E-EY5Q] (last updated Aug. 27, 
2020, 9:05 AM). 
 80. John Myers, California Unveils Sweeping Wildfire Prevention Plan amid Record Fire 
Losses and Drought, L.A. TIMES, https://www.latimes.com/california/story/2021-04-08/california-
wildfire-prevention-536-million-newsom-lawmakers [https://perma.cc/YZ69-65N2] (last updated 
Apr. 8, 2021, 5:13 PM).  
 81. CAL FIRE, supra note 2.  
 82. Flavelle, supra note 1.  
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prospective homeowners and current homeowners defaulting on their 
mortgages as a result of nonrenewal or cancellation.83  
In 2019, California’s state government addressed the crisis head 
on, at a great expense to insurance companies.84 The state imposed a 
one-year moratorium on refusing to renew homeowner insurance 
policies in certain wildfire-prone regions of the state.85 In other words, 
insurance companies were temporarily banned from pulling out of the 
market in fire-prone areas.86 To accomplish this feat, the California 
government leveraged its more desirable markets—expensive homes 
in low-risk areas—to protect its fire-prone markets. But the 
moratorium significantly impacted insurance companies’ profit 
margins, such that the state government could never make the 
arrangement permanent if it wanted to keep insurers in the state.87 
Facing the expiry of the emergency bill, the California government 
knew it needed a more sustainable replacement.88  
By the second half of 2020, the state legislature proposed a 
permanent law intended to serve as a compromise for consumers and 
insurance companies.89 In the proposal, insurance companies were 
allowed to incorporate climate predictions into rate-setting 
calculations—essentially softening California’s prior policy against 
rate-setting based on future projections—but in exchange, they were 
required to make insurance available to the regions they had 
previously abandoned and to offer discounted rates if consumers took 
 
 83. Id.; see also Katherine Chiglinsky & Elaine Chen, Many Californians Being Left Without 
Homeowners Insurance Due to Wildfire Risk, INS. J. (Dec. 4, 2020), https://
www.insurancejournal.com/news/west/2020/12/04/592788.htm [https://perma.cc/E9CL-Z9D6] 
(“In October, California’s insurance regulator reported that insurers refused to renew 235,250 
home insurance policies in 2019, a 31% increase from the prior year.”).  
 84. Flavelle, supra note 1.  
 85. The moratorium was triggered by a 2018 law requiring it to occur. James Bikales, 
California Protects Homeowners from Having Fire Insurance Dropped — Again, CAL MATTERS 
(Nov. 5, 2020), https://calmatters.org/environment/california-wildfires/2020/11/california-
homeowners-fire-insurance-dropped-again [https://perma.cc/AS3N-AW3N].  
 86. Id.  
 87. Cf. Nicole Friedman, California Bans Insurers from Dropping Homes in Wildfire Areas, 
WALL ST. J., https://www.wsj.com/articles/california-bans-insurers-from-dropping-homes-in-
wildfire-areas-11575585626 [https://perma.cc/2F44-WNNH] (last updated Dec. 5, 2019, 8:42 PM) 
(“Following devastating wildfire losses in 2017 and 2018, insurers have rapidly retreated from 
insuring wildfire-prone properties. Insurers have declined to renew tens of thousands of home-
insurance policies in areas with high wildfire risk in the past two years, including many properties 
that didn’t file claims.”).  
 88. Flavelle, supra note 1. 
 89. Id.; see also Assemb. B. 1816, 2019–20 Reg. Sess. (Cal. 2019) (establishing relief from 
certain liabilities for insurers writing insurance in high-risk zones). 
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precautions against fires.90 Consumer groups successfully advocated 
for the rejection of the law, claiming it was too favorable to insurers.91 
After the proposed law failed, California returned to its pattern of 
issuing a one-year moratorium to buy more time until a compromise 
could be reached.92 The state was left at a legislative impasse.93 Without 
a viable compromise, the California housing market and hundreds of 
homeowners living in fire-prone areas remain in jeopardy.94  
C.  Federal Intervention Emerges in a Post-Katrina World 
California’s homeowner insurance crisis is not the first time a 
natural disaster has laid waste to an otherwise relatively stable 
insurance market. The California wildfires have many predecessors—
most saliently, Hurricane Katrina. The hurricane damaged or 
destroyed over eight hundred thousand housing units, with estimated 
damages at $81 billion and estimated overall costs at over $160 billion 
dollars.95 Thousands were left homeless and without the finances to 
rebuild.96 The public response to the myriad crises of health, property, 
and economics following Hurricane Katrina was infamously 
disastrous,97 and the reaction to the underinsurance crisis was no 
exception. Both state and federal governments attempted to intervene 
in the insurance market, careful not to breach constitutional 
 
 90. Flavelle, supra note 1. 
 91. Id. 
 92. The proposed law was gutted in August 2020, id., and the one-year moratorium was 
issued in November 2020, Press Release, Cal. Dep’t of Ins., Insurance Commissioner Lara 
Protects More Than 2 Million Policyholders Affected by Wildfires from Policy Non-Renewal for 
One Year (Nov. 5, 2020), https://www.insurance.ca.gov/0400-news/0100-press-releases/2020/
release113-2020.cfm [https://perma.cc/5XDG-3MAA]. 
 93. See Flavelle, supra note 1 (explaining that after the law was “effectively gutted,” the 
insurance commissioner would focus on “working with high-risk communities to reduce their 
wildfire risk enough that insurers will keep offering coverage without big rate increases”).  
 94. Id. 
 95. Graduate Sch. of Oceanography, Univ. of R.I., Katrina Impacts, HURRICANES: SCI. & 
SOC’Y, http://www.hurricanescience.org/history/studies/katrinacase/impacts [https://perma.cc/
3SWA-HFR2].  
 96. Seth Fiegerman, Newsweek: Five Years After Katrina, Still Homeless, UNITY OF 
GREATER NEW ORLEANS (Aug. 23, 2010), https://unitygno.org/newsweek-five-years-after-
katrina-still-homeless [https://perma.cc/3RGC-TSCY]. 
 97. See Chris Edwards, Hurricane Katrina: Remembering the Federal Failures, CATO INST.: 
CATO AT LIBERTY (Aug. 27, 2015, 2:56 PM), https://www.cato.org/blog/hurricane-katrina-
remembering-federal-failures [https://perma.cc/LTB7-6WN7?type=image] (describing the 
“[c]ommunications [b]reakdown,” “[c]onfusion,” “[s]upply [f]ailures,” and “[a]buse” that 
occurred in the aftermath of Hurricane Katrina).  
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boundaries.98 The passage of emergency legislation offered some 
temporary relief to individual homeowners, but it was far from 
sufficient.99 The economic consequences of this failure are still felt 
today.100  
Decades prior to Hurricane Katrina, Congress passed the 
National Flood Insurance Act of 1968, which established the National 
Flood Insurance Program.101 The program was intended to serve as an 
alternative market for flood insurance, which insurance companies 
rarely offered due to the inability to set affordable premiums that 
would actually balance out the necessarily enormous payouts.102 For 
several decades, the program functioned effectively.103 Relatively few 
U.S. residents dipped into the program, often opting out of flood 
insurance altogether and taking their chances with the risk of natural 
disasters.104 This was even true in high-risk flooding zones where flood 
insurance was typically mandated but compliance was nonetheless 
quite low.105 Even though this meant the National Flood Insurance 
Program could operate without overextending its budget, it also meant 
 
 98. See H.B. 1302, 2006 Reg. Sess. (La. 2006) (avoiding reference to the National Flood 
Insurance Program and regulation thereof); 42 U.S.C. §§ 4001–4129 (creating a national flood 
insurance program that did not infringe upon states’ rights); see also State v. All Prop. & Cas. Ins. 
Carriers Authorized & Licensed To Do Bus., 937 So. 2d 313, 330 (La. 2006) (finding that state 
extensions on prescriptive periods were not preempted by the federal flood insurance program).  
 99. See 2006 La. Acts 802 (stopping the clock on prescriptive periods in an effort to help 
struggling Louisiana citizens); see also Fiegerman, supra note 96 (describing the lasting 
homelessness in New Orleans post-Katrina). 
 100. Fiegerman, supra note 96; Menzel, supra note 29, at 808–10. Additionally, victims of 
California wildfires and victims of Hurricane Katrina were both largely in low-income brackets. 
See Lower Income Areas More Likely To Have Structures Destroyed in Wildfires, Fire Data Shows, 
ABC (Nov. 7, 2019), https://abc7.com/fire-wildfire-income-low/5676733 [https://perma.cc/9XZ9-
ZR2W] (“Structures were twice as likely to be destroyed by wildfire where the median annual 
income was less than $50,000 a year . . . .”); Gary Rivlin, White New Orleans Has Recovered from 
Hurricane Katrina. Black New Orleans Has Not., TALK POVERTY (Aug. 29, 2016), https://
talkpoverty.org/2016/08/29/white-new-orleans-recovered-hurricane-katrina-black-new-orleans-
not [https://perma.cc/7TK8-HZHF] (noting that in the Lower Ninth Ward of New Orleans, which 
was heavily impacted by Hurricane Katrina, the average annual income was only $16,000).  
 101. National Flood Insurance Act of 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-448, 82 Stat. 572 (codified as 
amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 4001–4129) (establishing a national flood insurance program).  
 102. 42 U.S.C. § 4001(b).  
 103. CONG. RSCH. SERV., R44593, INTRODUCTION TO THE NATIONAL FLOOD INSURANCE 
PROGRAM (NFIP) 26 (2021), https://fas.org/sgp/crs/homesec/R44593.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZEB7-
HD5F] (“Prior to Hurricane Katrina in 2005, the [National Flood Insurance Program] had 
generally been able to cover its costs . . . .”).  
 104. See id. at 11 (highlighting low to moderate program enrollment even among communities 
where enrollment was required due to location in a high-risk zone).  
 105. Id. 
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a significant percentage of at-risk individuals were uninsured for 
disaster-related flooding.106 As a result, many were left financially 
devastated by Hurricane Katrina.107 
When harm is a routine occurrence, individuals need a permanent 
infrastructure upon which to rely.108 While this Note primarily focuses 
on insurance infrastructure, it is important to acknowledge the physical 
infrastructural failures that contributed to Hurricane Katrina’s 
devastating impact. Mass flooding that may have not otherwise 
occurred resulted from improperly designed and funded levees that 
surrounded areas below sea level.109 Levees can be effective—they 
have been in severe hurricanes in recent years.110 Though climate 
change perpetuates natural disasters, human shortcomings and 
oversights are as much the enemies. But Hurricane Katrina teaches 
that levee systems and related prevention plans are not infallible, hence 
the need to couple human interventions with dependable insurance 
programs to optimize for both resilience and recovery. 
After Hurricane Katrina hit, individuals relied upon the National 
Flood Insurance Program as never before, evinced by its eventual 
plunge into billions of dollars in debt to taxpayers.111 The program was 
responsible for paying out $16.1 billion in losses, which primarily 
related to personal property, including homes and personal 
belongings.112 The resulting debt, which remains today,113 suggests that 
a mostly nonmandatory program that only targets high-risk areas and 
has no effective enforcement regime will collapse when it is needed 
most, because it does not possess the resources for built-in resiliency to 
 
 106. See id. (noting that enrollment in designated high-risk flooding zones was as low as 43 
percent).  
 107. See Charles Herman, Katrina’s Economic Impact: One Year Later, ABC NEWS (Aug. 25, 
2006, 11:40 AM), https://abcnews.go.com/Business/HurricaneKatrina/story?id=2348619&page=1 
[https://perma.cc/7J4G-VF7X] (describing unemployment, lost homes, defaulting mortgages, and 
other instances of financial losses). 
 108. Id. 
 109. Jake Bittle, The Levees Worked in New Orleans — This Time, CURBED (Sept. 2, 2021), 
https://www.curbed.com/2021/09/levees-louisiana-hurricane-ida-managed-retreat.html [https://
perma.cc/L3ZT-XNQ4]. 
 110. See id. (describing the success of New Orleans’ levees against Hurricane Ida, a category 
4 storm). 
 111. CONG. RSCH. SERV., supra note 103, at 26–27. 
 112. ROBERT P. HARTWIG & CLAIRE WILKINSON, INS. INFO. INST., HURRICANE KATRINA: 
THE FIVE YEAR ANNIVERSARY 2 (2010), https://www.iii.org/sites/default/files/
1007Katrina5Anniversary.pdf [https://perma.cc/R5AQ-LJAZ]. 
 113. CONG. RSCH. SERV., supra note 103, at Summary. 
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major blows. The infeasibility of an insurance program with this 
structure has become evident.114  
States endeavored to take different approaches to post-Katrina 
insurance crises. The Louisiana government’s response, in particular, 
provides a compelling example of a state-level response from which 
future interventions into the insurance market can draw many lessons. 
In Louisiana, state-level intervention post-Katrina focused on 
prescriptive periods.115 Typically, insurance companies in Louisiana 
assign a prescriptive period, a window of time during which customers 
can file claims after losses have been incurred.116 In Louisiana, 
insurance companies were generally prohibited from writing contracts 
with prescriptive periods of fewer than twelve months.117 After 
Hurricane Katrina, Louisiana’s governor signed a series of executive 
orders expanding the prescriptive period for filing claims related to 
Hurricane Katrina.118 In practice, this stopped the clock for a year, so 
Louisiana residents impacted by the hurricane had more time to file 
claims with their insurance companies.119  
In Louisiana v. All Property and Casualty Insurance Carriers 
Authorized and Licensed To Do Business in the State of Louisiana,120 
the Louisiana Supreme Court was tasked with determining both 
whether the state legislation—expanding the prescriptive periods—
promulgated after the executive orders applied retroactively and 
whether it was constitutional.121 The court held the legislation applied 
retroactively, such that insurance companies were required to honor 
all claims arising out of Hurricane Katrina even if they predated the 
executive orders and legislation.122 Adversaries of the legislation, 
 
 114. Gilbert M. Gaul, How Rising Seas and Coastal Storms Drowned the U.S. Flood Insurance 
Program, YALE ENV’T 360 (May 23, 2017), https://e360.yale.edu/features/how-rising-seas-and-
coastal-storms-drowned-us-flood-insurance-program [https://perma.cc/7493-SFFG] (attributing 
the program’s debt to “improbably subsidiz[ing] thousands of risky properties . . . [and] charging 
them below-market premiums”).  
 115. 2006 La. Acts 802.  
 116. State v. All Prop. & Cas. Ins. Carriers Authorized & Licensed To Do Bus., 937 So. 2d 
313, 317 (La. 2006).  
 117. 2006 La. Acts 629.  
 118. These orders also responded to Hurricane Rita. La. Exec. Order KBB 05-32, 31 La. Reg. 
2169, 2169 (Sept. 20, 2005); La. Exec. Order KBB 05-48, 31 La. Reg. 2352, 2352 (Oct. 20, 2005); 
La. Exec. Order KBB 05-67, 31 La. Reg. 2675, 2675–76 (Nov. 20, 2005).  
 119. All Prop. & Cas. Ins. Carriers, 937 So. 2d at 317. 
 120. State v. All Prop. & Cas. Ins. Carriers Authorized & Licensed To Do Bus., 937 So. 2d 
313 (La. 2006). 
 121. Id. at 319, 322.  
 122. Id. at 327.  
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however, still questioned its constitutionality.123 Citing the Supremacy 
Clause, insurance companies pointed out the Louisiana legislation was 
superseded by the federally-regulated flood insurance program.124 The 
court rejected this assertion, explaining the state and federal 
interventions could in fact work in tandem.125 As a result, the court 
clarified, the Supremacy Clause was not even triggered in this context 
because the state intervention made no attempt to regulate the federal 
program.126  
Government flood insurance programs, however, have failed 
taxpayers because they did not align with the nature of flooding.127 
Floods are repetitive disasters, which routinely—and at least somewhat 
predictably—cause large-scale property damage.128 Existing insurance 
programs and extended prescriptive periods do not acknowledge this 
reality. Instead, they treat floods as few and far between, banking on 
the impractical hope that the programs can financially recover in time 
for the next major flooding event.129 This reflects the same conundrum 
facing California: although an opt-in insurance program makes sense 
for relatively infrequent earthquakes, the same programs lead to an 
insurance availability crisis when applied to wildfires.130 In the cases of 
both wildfires and floods, permanent, resilient policies must enable the 
government, insurance companies, and homeowners to respond 
effectively when losses skyrocket.131  
But Hurricane Katrina is not the only example of government 
intervention in the insurance context. This Note next turns to how the 
federal government has intervened in the health insurance market and 
subsequently draws analogies between these two frameworks. 
 
 123. See id. at 319 (describing the defendants’ argument that the acts violate the Supremacy 
Clause and Contract Clause of the Constitution).  
 124. Id. at 328.  
 125. Id. at 330.  
 126. Id. at 329.  
 127. See Ella Nilsen, The National Flood Insurance Program Was Already $24 Billion in Debt 
Before Harvey and Irma, VOX, https://www.vox.com/2017/8/26/16208230/hurricane-harvey-flood-
damage [https://perma.cc/G77F-37MS] (last updated Sept. 11, 2017, 3:08 PM) (describing how 
repetitive payouts to properties in frequent flooding zones drain program funding).  
 128. See id. (“[T]he [National Flood Insurance Program] . . . is designed to pay out claims over 
and over again in the most flood-prone areas, where some houses have been flooded multiple 
times.”).  
 129. See id. (referencing multiple government officials who consider the repetitive payouts 
accompanying major storm surges unsustainable).  
 130. See supra notes 72–80 and accompanying text (describing how the frequency of 
earthquakes versus wildfires influences how insurance schemes should be regulated). 
 131. See discussion infra Part II.C (advocating for permanent legislation).  
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D.  The ACA as a Federal Intervention 
Where access to insurance can enable an individual to rebuild 
their home after a natural disaster strikes, access to health insurance 
can protect an individual from insurmountable medical bills when 
health problems occur. With this in mind, the lessons taken from 
Hurricane Katrina regarding insurance frameworks mirror those 
embodied by the ACA. Here, the effectiveness of permanent programs 
to help people pay for routine, but significant, healthcare costs was 
tested in March 2010, when President Barack Obama signed the ACA 
into law.132 Within minutes of signing, the federal government faced 
lawsuits from thirteen states asserting the ACA was 
unconstitutional.133 From its inception to today, the ACA has been 
marred in controversy.134 Nevertheless, invaluable lessons about the 
cultural drivers of insurance reform have already emerged despite the 
ACA’s relatively short lifespan. 
1. The ACA’s Passage and Changing U.S. Sentiment.  At the time 
of the ACA’s passage, the need for nationwide healthcare reform had 
been long apparent.135 The rising costs of healthcare, the high number 
of uninsured individuals in the United States, and health disparities 
across states were clearly unsustainable.136 Individuals with preexisting 
conditions were among those most gravely impacted by insufficient 
healthcare protection.137 Routinely denied insurance, these individuals 
often were left to shoulder the burdens of their own healthcare costs.138 
Many remained with their employers for years solely because of 
 
 132. See Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 25, 26, 42 U.S.C.) (enacting federal healthcare 
reform). 
 133. Michael J. Graetz & Jerry L. Mashaw, Constitutional Uncertainty and the Design of Social 
Insurance: Reflections on the Obamacare Case, 7 HARV. L. & POL’Y REV. 343, 344 (2013).  
 134. See id. at 343–46 (describing the ACA’s controversy following enactment and the 
resulting legal dispute); see also Katie Keith, ACA Litigation Round-Up: A Status Check, HEALTH 
AFFS. (Feb. 1, 2021), https://www.healthaffairs.org/do/10.1377/hblog20210201.561637/full [https:/
/perma.cc/U4CK-FK35] (describing recent challenges to the ACA).  
 135. See generally WILENSKY & TEITELBAUM, supra note 54, at 190–97 (chronicling flaws in 
the U.S. healthcare system and the historical efforts to reform it).  
 136. Id. at 190.  
 137. See James Roland, The Pros and Cons of Obamacare, HEALTHLINE, https://
www.healthline.com/health/consumer-healthcare-guide/pros-and-cons-obamacare [https://
perma.cc/C2EZ-ZJZ4] (last updated Aug. 16, 2019) (“A preexisting condition . . . made it difficult 
for many people to get health insurance before the ACA”).  
 138. Id.  
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healthcare coverage, fearing that fair rates would be unavailable if they 
pursued another professional path.139  
The enormous burden placed upon individuals with preexisting 
conditions reflected a culture of ableism and a refusal to assume 
collective social responsibility for the ill.140 Some social responsibility 
was assumed by the states, which promulgated most healthcare-related 
regulations and structured their own Medicaid programs, with 
Medicare for the elderly being a notable federally-assumed 
exception.141 This perpetuated a patchwork approach to health 
insurance, driving adverse healthcare outcomes.142  
The ACA exemplifies a cultural shift in thinking about who should 
assume responsibility for the ill.143 More specifically, there was an 
evident transformation in how the public perceived the risks associated 
with insuring individuals through a social insurance scheme.144 The 
notion of “social insurance” is based on the principle of government 
intervention.145 Both private and social insurance involve estimations 
of risks, loss predictions, and pooled risks, but a social insurance model 
requires a government to intervene where private insurance models 
cannot achieve a profit.146 A social insurance model is most valuable 
when it makes sense to subsidize high-risk individuals through an 
individual mandate .147  
 
 139. At Risk: Pre-Existing Conditions Could Affect 1 in 2 Americans, CTRS. FOR MEDICAID 
& MEDICARE SERVS., https://www.cms.gov/CCIIO/Resources/Forms-Reports-and-Other-
Resources/preexisting [https://perma.cc/29UP-PJAF]. 
 140. See supra notes 32–34 and accompanying text (describing cultural barriers to assuming 
public responsibility for the ill).  
 141. Nicole Huberfeld, Federalizing Medicaid, 14 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 431, 435, 437–41 (2011) 
(describing how regulating healthcare was a responsibility typically left to the states prior to 
Medicare).  
 142. See, e.g., INST. OF MED., CARE WITHOUT COVERAGE: TOO LITTLE, TOO LATE 52–53 
(2002) (noting that some studies in the cancer context showed those with Medicaid often fared 
similar or worse in cancer outcomes compared to those without health insurance). 
 143. Huberfeld, supra note 141, at 438–40 (cataloging the history of U.S. healthcare in terms 
of perspectives on poverty, deservedness, and a “decentralized” approach to responsibility and 
welfare).  
 144. Graetz & Mashaw, supra note 133, at 350.  
 145. Id.  
 146. See id. at 350–56 (explaining the role of pooled risk, which is fundamentally based on a 
greater risk estimation scheme).  
 147. See id. at 351 (“But there is a range of circumstances in which mandatory insurance, with 
subsidies to those at high risk (through some combination of tax revenues and the premiums of 
those with lower risks), is sound policy. This is the realm of social insurance.”).  
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In over nine hundred pages, the ACA rewrote the U.S. healthcare 
system via federal intervention.148 Most relevantly, it had two major 
accomplishments: First, it required nearly all U.S. citizens and lawful 
permanent residents to purchase health insurance or else suffer a 
modest fine.149 Second, the ACA requires insurance companies to 
provide coverage without individual premium underwriting for 
individuals with preexisting conditions.150 Congress determined the 
preexisting conditions provisions could not exist without an individual 
mandate to pay for it.151 As a result, the individual mandate was 
rendered inherently critical: if the ACA were to truly capture the 
notion of social responsibility for the chronically ill, its funding 
depended upon participation from everyone else.152 Additionally, even 
though the ACA was projected to increase insurance premiums for 
thousands of individuals across the United States, it would ultimately 
reduce the financial burden on both the healthcare system and 
insurers.153 
2. Sebelius and the Taxing Power.  The individual mandate 
triggered significant backlash.154 Adversaries claimed it violated the 
Constitution.155 In National Federation of Independent Business v. 
Sebelius,156 the question came before the Supreme Court.157 The Court 
evaluated the individual mandate in the context of Congress’s taxing 
power, the Commerce Clause, and the Necessary and Proper Clause.158 
 
 148. Id. at 343–44.  
 149. No Health Insurance? See If You’ll Owe a Fee, HEALTHCARE.GOV, https://
www.healthcare.gov/fees/fee-for-not-being-covered [https://perma.cc/C222-8KVR]; see also 
Robert S. Peck, Understanding the Constitutional Challenges to Federal Health Care Reform, 
BRIEF, Summer 2011, at 28, 28 (describing the penalty). 
 150. 42 U.S.C. § 18001.  
 151. See id. § 18091(2)(I) (“The [mandate] is essential to creating effective health insurance 
markets in which improved health insurance products that are guaranteed issue and do not 
exclude coverage of pre-existing conditions can be sold.”). 
 152. Importantly, the ACA can be contrasted with the National Flood Insurance Program, 
which only mandated participation from high-risk individuals and subsequently accrued massive 
debts. See supra Part I.C. This further demonstrates the necessity of a broader mandate.  
 153. See 42 U.S.C. § 18091(2) (summarizing the positive economic impact of the ACA). 
 154. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 540–42 (2012) (describing the 
various constitutional challenges to provisions of the ACA litigated in the Eleventh Circuit). 
 155. Id. at 540. 
 156. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012). 
 157. Id. at 542.  
 158. See generally id. (analyzing the ACA under these clauses in turn).  
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In a 5-4 decision,159 the Court upheld the individual mandate as a valid 
exercise of Congress’s taxing power, but it also stated the mandate was 
justifiable under neither the Commerce Clause nor the Necessary and 
Proper Clause.160 With respect to the Commerce Clause, the Court 
took issue with Congress’s attempts to regulate inactivity (not having 
insurance) and to compel activity (purchasing insurance), concluding 
that both goals exceeded congressional authority.161 But the taxing 
power, which allows Congress to levy taxes for the general welfare of 
the United States, functions differently.162 According to the Court, the 
“penalty”—a somewhat troublesome misnomer—associated with the 
individual mandate resembled a tax in all relevant respects and was 
calculated and collected via the same processes as other federal 
taxes.163 Unlike a penalty, taxes must not be punitive. The Court found 
that the individual mandate’s penalty never exceeded the cost of 
obtaining insurance—and therefore was not coercive—and was not 
associated with criminal consequences, so the penalty was not 
punitive.164 Thus, the individual mandate penalty survived as a tax.165  
Despite the individual mandate’s judicial success, it was 
significantly undermined five years later under the Trump 
administration through the 2017 Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, which 
eliminated the penalty for failing to comply with the mandate.166 
Surprisingly, the ACA remains intact and functional—at least insofar 
as enrollment has continued in high numbers—more than a year after 
the penalty was eliminated and as of this writing.167 Behaviorists 
 
 159. Chief Justice John Roberts, along with Justices Ruth Bader Ginsburg, Stephen Breyer, 
Sonia Sotomayor, and Elena Kagan, held the individual mandate was a valid exercise of 
Congress’s taxing power. Id. at 529, 588. Roberts, along with Justices Antonin Scalia, Anthony 
Kennedy, Clarence Thomas, and Samuel Alito, believed the mandate was not within the scope of 
the Commerce Clause or the Necessary and Proper Clause. Id. at 588. However, neither Scalia, 
Kennedy, Thomas, nor Alito concurred in Roberts’s opinion, so this was not a controlling vote. 
Id. at 588. Roberts, along with Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas, Breyer, Alito, and Kagan, concurred in 
judging the Medicaid expansion provision unconstitutional. Id. 
 160. Id. at 560–63.  
 161. Id. at 558. 
 162. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1.  
 163. Sebelius, 567 U.S. at 563–64.  
 164. Id. at 566. 
 165. Id. at 574.  
 166. Tax Cuts and Jobs Act, Pub. L. No. 115-97, § 11081, 131 Stat. 2054, 2092 (2017) (codified 
as amended in scattered sections of I.R.C.).  
 167. Christine Eibner & Sarah Nowak, The Effect of Eliminating the Individual Mandate 
Penalty and the Role of Behavioral Factors, COMMONWEALTH FUND (July 11, 2018), https://
www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/fund-reports/2018/jul/eliminating-individual-mandate-
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contemplating this possibility prior to the repeal of the individual 
mandate hypothesized that such an outcome may reflect public inertia 
toward obtaining health insurance, uncertainty about the law, or a 
change in how the public perceives health risks.168 
For individuals with preexisting conditions, the ACA is an 
enormous success and a much-needed federal intervention; it not only 
minimizes financial strain on these individuals, but it also marks a pivot 
from the perception of the chronically ill as a societal burden.169 Prior 
to the ACA, increasing insurance rates for individuals with preexisting 
conditions and the resulting limited employment opportunities 
available to these individuals was indicative of U.S. society subscribing 
to the notion that the chronically ill should be made to suffer 
consequences for the disproportionate burden they place on the 
healthcare system.170 Today, a majority of individuals in the United 
States have debatably accepted the idea of public responsibility for the 
chronically ill.171  
Returning to the disaster context, the ACA example invites two 
questions: First, can U.S. society view a higher risk of losing a home to 
a natural disaster as analogous to a preexisting health condition? 
Second, can U.S. society achieve the same cultural shift as is reflected 
in the ACA toward assuming public responsibility for these homes? 
II.  ADAPTING THE ACA FOR THE HOMEOWNER INSURANCE 
MARKET 
This Part further elaborates on the function of insurance and 
utilizes the ACA as a model for understanding the objectives of 
insurance stakeholders and their relevant constraints. Next, this Part 
 
penalty-behavioral-factors [https://perma.cc/9L8P-2F87]; see also Press Release, U.S. Dep’t of 
Health & Hum. Servs., New HHS Data Show More Americans than Ever Have Health Coverage 
Through the Affordable Care Act (June 5, 2021), https://www.hhs.gov/about/news/2021/06/05/
new-hhs-data-show-more-americans-than-ever-have-health-coverage-through-affordable-care-
act.html [https://perma.cc/FK2X-GQBG] (announcing that a record thirty-one million people 
enrolled under the ACA in 2021).  
 168. Eibner & Nowak, supra note 167. 
 169. See supra notes 32–34 and accompanying text (describing cultural barriers to assuming a 
public responsibility for the chronically ill and how those were overcome by the ACA).  
 170. See supra notes 137–144 and accompanying text. 
 171. See supra note 34 and accompanying text; see also EHEALTH, SURVEY: ACA 
CONSUMERS ON THE FUTURE OF COVERAGE 6 (2019), https://news.ehealthinsurance.com/_ir/68/
20198/eHealth_Survey_ACA_Consumers_on_the_Future_of_Coverage.pdf [https://perma.cc/
VLX8-PF2E] (finding that 77 percent of U.S. residents surveyed would want to retain coverage 
for preexisting conditions if the ACA was revised).  
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proposes a specific federal intervention inspired by the ACA. This 
intervention consists of the U.S. federal government mandating all U.S. 
homeowners to acquire disaster insurance or pay a penalty affixed to 
their mortgage payments. This Part describes this proposal and 
subsequently explains both its constitutionality under Congress’s 
taxing power and its ability to survive criticism that it would violate 
federalist principles. 
A.  Recovery, Mitigation, and Prevention: Drawing from the ACA 
Protecting disaster-prone homes and individuals with preexisting 
conditions under parallel regulatory schemes may not be intuitive. 
Nevertheless, the comparison is both apt and useful. The two types of 
regulation are related through similar underlying market forces and the 
fundamental purpose of insurance generally. Even where this analogy 
is strained, the distinctions between disaster insurance and health 
insurance may be leveraged to better serve a proposed model for 
disaster insurance.  
To begin, insurance has three fundamental purposes. First, 
insurance advances recovery efforts; when an individual faces a large, 
unexpected expense, the money paid into the insurance system can be 
used to help that individual recover expenses.172 Second, insurance 
mitigates harm—that is, financial risk—to those in the insured pool by 
spreading risks to lessen the burden on each individual, thereby 
stabilizing the risk of harm for the entire group.173 This is best 
understood in the context of health insurance, wherein the majority of 
a medical bill is paid for by the insurance company, and the patient is 
responsible for only a modest deductible and copayment.174 Recovery 
and mitigation are interrelated, but there are key distinctions—where 
mitigation efforts are focused on reducing an individual’s burden, 
recovery efforts are meant to expedite the rate at which an individual 
 
 172. Robert H. Jerry, II, Managing Hurricane (and Other Natural Disaster) Risk, 6 TEX. A&M 
L. REV. 391, 407 (2019).  
 173. Id. at 407–09. 
 174. In addition to premiums, the insured often pays a deductible (essentially a baseline 
amount that the insured pays before an insurance company will pay the remaining) and a 
copayment, which is a fixed proportion of the cost of a particular medical service. See WILENSKY 
& TEITELBAUM, supra note 54, at 156–57 (describing the basic mechanics of health insurance).  
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returns to their “normal” state.175 Third, insurance prevents harm.176 
This prong is oft neglected, but it is economically the most critical.177  
In the context of healthcare, prevention may mean incentivizing 
individuals to make healthier choices, reducing burdens on the 
healthcare system and, consequently, on insurance payouts.178 The 
ACA reflects a particular philosophy on prevention: possessing health 
insurance itself is a preventative measure.179 Individuals with health 
insurance are more likely to participate in preventative healthcare, 
such as screenings for disease, prenatal care, and annual exams, which 
reduces the overall burden on the healthcare system.180 This was, in 
part, the logic of the ACA’s individual mandate—only rather than 
incentivize the healthy behavior that results from having health 
insurance, the ACA required having insurance (functionally creating 
healthy behavior).181 Prevention principles also justify guaranteed issue 
of health insurance for those with preexisting conditions and risk 
pooling more generally; having insurance decreases the likelihood that 
individuals with preexisting conditions will allow their conditions to 
linger uncared for, such that they would result in an even larger burden 
on the healthcare system when symptoms become increasingly 
severe.182 And from an infectious disease perspective, more people 
utilizing the healthcare system at earlier stages likely reduces the 
 
 175. See Jerry, supra note 172, at 409 (describing the mitigative role insurance plays by 
reducing the insured’s future expenses when recovering from a loss).  
 176. Id. at 408. 
 177. See id. at 408–09 (explaining the significance and particular relevance of the prevention 
prong to natural disasters).  
 178. See, e.g., Stephen R. Permut, Health Care Reform in Delaware in the Wake of Federal 
Inaction, DEL. LAW., Spring 1995, at 23, 23 (explaining how taking precautions is a way to relieve 
burdens on the healthcare system).  
 179. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 25, 26, 42 U.S.C.). See generally Joseph D. Freeman, 
Srikanth Kadiyala, Janice F. Bell & Diane P. Martin, The Causal Effect of Health Insurance on 
Utilization and Outcomes in Adults, 46 MED. CARE 1023 (2008) (demonstrating the relationship 
between the possession of health insurance and utilization of the healthcare system at earlier 
stages in care).  
 180. Freeman et al., supra note 179, at 1024 tbl.1, 1028 tbl.3. 
 181. See 42 U.S.C. § 18091 (requiring basic health insurance).  
 182. See Susan Levine, Erin Malone, Akaki Lekiachvili & Peter Briss, Health Care Industry 
Insights: Why the Use of Preventive Services Is Still Low, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & 
PREVENTION: PREVENTING CHRONIC DISEASE (Mar. 14, 2019), https://www.cdc.gov/pcd/issues/
2019/18_0625.htm [https://perma.cc/B8QF-C4LK] (outlining the multitrillion dollar burden of 
caring for the chronically ill and highlighting the role that preventative care can play in reducing 
the incidence and severity of chronic illness). 
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spread of contagious diseases that may have otherwise spread 
unchecked.183 
Prior to the ACA, a key critique of health insurance was its 
emphasis on compensating victims for their losses—recovery and 
mitigation—rather than on prevention.184 Health insurance, then 
regulated exclusively at the state level, was piecemeal.185 The result, as 
one study examining this issue in Delaware observed, was community-
level adverse health outcomes.186 When the state invested more in 
healthcare relative to other states, its economic growth was suppressed 
relative to those states due to increased strains on the state’s 
finances.187 This reflects a collective action problem impacting state-
level regulatory regimes across the board. Even though states stand to 
make long-term gains from implementing strong public healthcare 
regimes, no individual state will assume the burden if doing so reduces 
the state’s ability to economically compete in the near term with states 
that do not implement such a regime. The resulting impasse, therefore, 
is best addressed at the federal level.  
The federal government endeavored to resolve these interstate 
health and economic disparities through federal intervention. In 
particular, the preexisting conditions provisions of the ACA allowed 
individuals with these conditions to manage them more proactively.188 
Consequently, the ACA promoted a novel—at least at the national 
level—prevention-oriented approach to health insurance.189  
Notably, the ACA did not reduce the cost of insurance for 
individuals taking precautions to avoid healthcare costs—in other 
 
 183. See Rama K. Jayanti & Alvin C. Burns, The Antecedents of Preventive Health Care 
Behavior: An Empirical Study, 26 J. ACAD. MKTG. SCI. 6, 6 (1998) (“Preventative health care 
refers to behaviors that will prolong one’s healthy life or practices that otherwise lessen the effects 
of infectious disease . . . .”).  
 184. See Nadia Chait & Sherry Glied, Promoting Prevention Under the Affordable Care Act, 
39 ANN. REV. PUB. HEALTH 507, 508 (2018) (noting that there are calls for the ACA to increase 
prevention-focused measures).  
 185. See WILENSKY & TEITELBAUM, supra note 54, at 153 (explaining how the United States 
has no national healthcare system). 
 186. Permut, supra note 178. 
 187. Id.  
 188. See, e.g., Aparna Soni, Laura R. Wherry & Kosali I. Simon, How Have ACA Insurance 
Expansions Affected Health Outcomes? Findings from the Literature, 39 HEALTH AFFS. 371, 373 
(2020) (summarizing some positive outcomes arising out of the Medicaid expansion for the 
chronically ill, many of whom were able to learn about and treat their conditions earlier).  
 189. Id. at 376.  
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words, making healthier choices.190 To do so would contradict the 
notion of guaranteed issue for individuals with preexisting conditions, 
because many of these conditions are neither a result of unhealthy 
choices nor within the individuals’ abilities to mitigate through 
alternative lifestyle choices.191 Rewarding healthier people is akin to 
punishing unhealthier ones, which undermines the theory of public 
responsibility for the ill.192  
The case is different, however, for natural disasters. There are a 
number of precautions that can be taken to reduce the magnitude of 
losses associated with natural disasters.193 Insurance companies may, 
for example, reduce rates for individuals living in fire-prone areas if 
those individuals agree to reduce dry brush on their property or use 
fire-resistant building materials.194 Ideally, the insured would save in 
the near-term on their rates, while the insurer would save in the long-
term by reducing large payouts. Under this framework, the federal 
government can still guarantee issue for any homeowner living in a 
disaster-prone region, while simultaneously crediting these 
homeowners for taking steps to reduce potential losses. This 
framework builds upon the practice of community rating, wherein 
insurance companies must provide the same rates for all members in a 
given community or region and establish that rate based on aggregate 
 
 190. See Caroline Cournoyer, Should Medicaid Incentivize Healthy Behavior?, GOVERNING 
(Mar. 5, 2013), https://www.governing.com/columns/col-should-medicaid-encourage-healthy-
behavior.html [https://perma.cc/75NW-LDYF] (describing the federal government’s lack of 
action and interest in defining and incentivizing healthy behavior). 
 191. Not only are one in two Americans affected by a preexisting condition, but “15 to 30 
percent of people in perfectly good health today are likely to develop a pre-existing condition 
over the next eight years.” CTRS. FOR MEDICARE & MEDICAID SERVS., supra note 139. 
Developing such a condition can occur regardless of lifestyle choices, as is the case for many 
genetic diseases. See George L. Wehby, Benjamin W. Domingue & Fredric D. Wolinsky, Genetic 
Risks for Chronic Conditions: Implications for Long-Term Wellbeing, 73 J. GERONTOLOGY: MED. 
SCIS. 477, 477 (2017) (finding a positive relationship between genetic predisposition and worse 
disease outcomes for those with chronic diseases). Many circumstantial risk factors also increase 
the likelihood of developing a condition. Heart Disease Risk Factors You Can’t Control, OFF. ON 
WOMEN’S HEALTH, https://www.womenshealth.gov/heart-disease-and-stroke/heart-disease/
heart-disease-risk-factors/cant-control [https://perma.cc/U738-9FTN] (last updated Mar. 14, 
2019) (enumerating risk factors for heart disease, such as age, that are beyond the individual’s 
control to mitigate). 
 192. See supra notes 33–34, 140–147 and accompanying text (explaining how a desire to 
assume public responsibility translated into guaranteed issue for people with preexisting 
conditions). 
 193. Jerry, supra note 172, at 408–09.  
 194. Cf. id. at 398 n.30 (discussing California’s problem with wildfires and the reasons behind 
it).  
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risk rather than underwriting based on each individual.195 There is an 
important cost-benefit analysis here: investing in precautions requires 
funds and labor that not all homeowners possess, such that offering 
reduced premiums to those who adopt such precautions raises a valid 
fairness issue that must be triaged with the very real need to subsidize 
risk. In an ideal world, precaution crediting could be justified by using 
the costs insurers save in reduced payouts to help fund precautions for 
those who cannot implement them themselves. In other words, if 
precautions reduce losses, insurers save money that they can then 
invest in more precautions. 
Guaranteed issue and precaution crediting may seem inherently 
contradictory—which, as discussed, is the reason only guaranteed issue 
and not precaution crediting was included in the ACA.196 But in the 
disaster insurance market, the two are more compatible. Unlike in 
health insurance, in which assuming public responsibility for the ill 
drives the framework, the public responsibility impetus is weaker with 
regard to property ownership. In homeownership, there is a greater 
element of choice than is present in the healthcare system—to a certain 
extent, individuals have the power to choose where they live and to 
what degree their properties are resilient to disaster.197 Additionally, 
property ownership is generally limited to those with economic means, 
but health insurance is required for all members of the population.198 
In this way, what may seem like a limiting principle actually creates 
more options for modeling disaster insurance than were available to 
the federal government when developing the ACA.  
 
 195. WILENSKY & TEITELBAUM, supra note 54, at 160.  
 196. See supra notes 190–192 and accompanying text (explaining how the ACA does not 
provide for a reduction in premiums on account of taking precautions because doing so would 
ignore the reality that many preexisting conditions do not result from unhealthy decision-
making). 
 197. See supra notes 22–24 and 61–63 and accompanying text (describing, from an 
environmental justice perspective, the constraints many individuals face that prevent them from 
relocating); cf. Gina Yannitell Reinhardt, Why People Stay in Disaster-Prone Cities, 
CONVERSATION (Oct. 6, 2017, 6:28 AM), https://theconversation.com/why-people-stay-in-
disaster-prone-cities-84882 [https://perma.cc/KVU3-FD9A] (observing what motivates 
individuals to choose to live in high-risk areas despite the ability to choose otherwise).  
 198. And importantly, healthcare in the United States will be provided to all individuals, 
regardless of economic means (and the subject of whom to hold financially responsible after the 
fact remains controversial). James Yoo, What Will Happen if I Go to the Hospital Without 
Insurance?, HEALTHCARE INSIDER, https://healthcareinsider.com/hospital-no-insurance-59540 
[https://perma.cc/T5VA-PJBB] (last updated Mar. 19, 2021). Obviously, homes may be provided 
to those without economic means (such as through public housing), but homeownership requires 
at least an initial financial investment.  
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As previously observed, there are numerous ways to incentivize 
disaster preparedness and greater resiliency to property damage—
thereby reducing payouts.199 Given that reducing payouts is the 
objective of property insurers, what should be the objectives of 
insurance legislation? Effective regulatory measures perpetuate 
maximum coverage, fair rates, profitability, and good behavior (i.e., the 
prevention element).200 Consumers should be incentivized to reduce 
their own risks, while insurance companies should be incentivized to 
keep rates reasonable.201 Armed with a better understanding of how 
health insurance and disaster insurance differ from each other, one can 
more readily identify which aspects of the ACA contain the most value 
for developing a new model of disaster insurance—namely, guaranteed 
issue and individual mandates.  
B.  Modeling a Federal Intervention 
The model for an intervention now begins to take shape. The 
optimal model for disaster insurance reveals that to properly address 
the dual crises of underinsurance and increasing frequency of natural 
disasters, a permanent individual mandate for disaster insurance is 
necessary. This Note proposes that the federal government mandate 
that individual homeowners either purchase general natural disaster 
insurance or pay a penalty attached to mortgage payments. These 
reforms will maximize the number of individuals in the disaster 
insurance pool and accommodate geographic variation in the type of 
disaster encountered. 
Further, under this proposal, disaster insurance would be available 
through private insurers as well as through a subsidized federal 
government program. Private insurers would not be permitted to deny 
non-disaster-related homeowner insurance on the basis of disaster-
related risk. The program would have features designed to encourage 
responsible decision-making and reduce long-term costs—namely, 
credits for taking precautions that increase resiliency during disaster. 
Importantly, this proposal should not be taken in isolation or treated 
as the singular solution to the imminent natural disaster crisis; instead, 
 
 199. See infra note 216 and accompanying text (offering one proposal for incentivizing 
disaster preparedness through tax credits for taking precautionary measures).  
 200. See WILENSKY & TEITELBAUM, supra note 54, at 156–62 (summarizing how 
stakeholders, namely the insured and insurer, have differing priorities (such as the insurer needing 
to profit while the insured wants a fair rate) that must be balanced by regulators).  
 201. Id. at 158–61. 
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it should be coupled with a rigorous evaluation of localized risk levels 
in order to determine the discrete areas from which relocation is 
absolutely necessary.  
An insurance crisis related to natural disasters must be addressed 
through an individual mandate because individuals cannot afford to 
assume the risks associated with rebuilding their homes.202 Insurance 
companies, under existing models, have no feasible way to clear a profit 
in a disaster-prone area and cannot be compelled to participate in a 
market that will only bankrupt them in the long term.203 States cannot 
afford to bail out homeowners through emergency insurance 
programs, at least not without raising taxes, seeking federal aid, or 
failing the requirement to balance their budget with expenditures.204 
States are often also constrained by statutory requirements that they 
balance their budgets with their expenditures, a requirement that does 
not exist at higher levels of government.205 Because individuals, 
insurance companies, and states cannot resolve this crisis on their own, 
the federal government must intervene.206 Along with implementing 
the individual mandate, the federal government could offer a 
subsidized federal insurance program.  
The federal government will be unable to achieve a meaningful 
contribution absent permanent legislative action; a reactive, as-needed 
system is demonstrably ineffective.207 In the wake of Hurricane 
Katrina, mandating insurance enrollment on a high-risk-only basis 
ultimately bankrupted the program, generating billions of dollars in 
 
 202. See Cowan, supra note 3 (elaborating on the incredible costs associated with natural 
disaster losses).  
 203. See, e.g., Flavelle, supra note 1 (describing concerns about home insurance availability 
and long-term profitability in California due to increasing costs from wildfires).  
 204. See THE PEW CHARITABLE TRS., HOW STATES CAN MANAGE THE CHALLENGES OF 
PAYING FOR NATURAL DISASTERS 3 (2020), https://www.pewtrusts.org/-/media/assets/2020/09/
how-states-can-manage-the-challenges-of-paying-for-natural-disasters.pdf [https://perma.cc/
U9TT-D9LB] (describing how states have faced increasing pressure to pay for natural disasters 
with decreasing federal support despite requirements that they balance budget with 
expenditures).  
 205. See TAX POL’Y CTR., THE TAX POLICY CENTER BRIEFING BOOK 677 (2020), https://
www.taxpolicycenter.org/sites/default/files/briefing-book/tpc_briefing_book_2021.pdf [https://
perma.cc/V55J-56C7] (describing the Balanced Budget Requirements that apply to states). 
 206. Cf. discussion supra Part I.D (discussing how the ACA was a federal intervention 
necessitated by the growing crisis of health underinsurance).  
 207. Cf. discussion supra Part I.C (elaborating on the failures of emergency interventions 
during Hurricane Katrina). 
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debt for the federal government.208 This is not well suited to the 
increasing frequency and severity of natural disasters;209 because these 
are now regular occurrences, homeowners will benefit far more from a 
stable, resiliency-oriented system. The ACA is an example of such 
legislation.210 If natural disasters are as routine and predictable as are 
trips to the hospital,211 a federal intervention should be designed with 
an understanding of the ongoing need for federally subsidized 
homeowner insurance.  
Additionally, it is clear the federal government can and should 
mandate disaster insurance for homeowners. The litigation 
surrounding the ACA has answered the constitutional question of 
whether the federal government is authorized to install such a 
mandate.212 Congress could install a tax lower than the cost of insuring 
a home for those who opt out of purchasing disaster insurance when 
they take out a mortgage, so long as Congress seeks only to influence, 
not criminalize, alternative behavior.213 An insurance mandate will be 
effective because, by increasing the number of insured persons, the 
premiums will be lowered and thus become more affordable for 
consumers who need the insurance most.214 By increasing the size of 
the pool, the risk is spread across a higher number of individuals, 
ensuring insurance companies’ bottom lines.215 The federal 
government could then offer tax credits via the taxing power or 
 
 208. See supra notes 111–114 and accompanying text (describing how an emergency 
expansion to the federal flood insurance program resulted in the program generating billions in 
debt).  
 209. See supra notes 9–12 and accompanying text (providing evidence for the increased 
frequency and severity of natural disasters in regions previously unaffected). 
 210. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 25, 26, 42 U.S.C.); see also Phil McCausland, ‘A Big 
Safety Net’: Affordable Care Act Filled Need, Fended Off Dismantling in 2020, NBC NEWS (Nov. 
28, 2020, 4:28 AM), https://www.nbcnews.com/politics/politics-news/big-safety-net-affordable-
care-act-filled-need-fended-dismantling-n1249149 [https://perma.cc/4TT9-7LPU].  
 211. See supra notes 9–12 and accompanying text (discussing how unchecked climate change 
has perpetuated worsening natural disaster scenarios of greater regularity). 
 212. See supra notes 158–165 and accompanying text (summarizing the outcome in Sebelius). 
 213. Cf. Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 566–67 (2012) (justifying the 
ACA’s individual mandate). As a clarifying point, the mortgage providers still would mandate 
homeowner insurance. See infra note 226 and accompanying text. Only disaster-specific 
insurance, which is currently optional in most contexts, is covered by this penalty.  
 214. Cf. Alexander Lemann, Rolling Back the Tide: Toward an Individual Mandate for Flood 
Insurance, 26 FORDHAM ENV’T L. REV. 166, 204–05 (2015) (explaining, in the context of the 
National Flood Insurance Program, how the dynamics of risk-spreading influence who bears the 
associated costs).  
 215. Id. 
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Commerce Clause to individuals who take precautions against natural 
disaster-related losses, further reducing the scale of loss and the 
severity of the resulting consequences.216  
The scope of a mandate must be nationwide. Federally mandating 
disaster insurance within only certain states triggers a plethora of 
federalism concerns that would likely render the mandate 
unconstitutional.217 It would also undermine the objective of creating 
risk pools large enough that costs can be efficiently distributed.218 Even 
a less stringent approach wherein disaster insurance was mandated 
only in specified disaster-prone regions is problematic so long as 
defining which regions should qualify remains everchanging and 
arguably arbitrary.219 Such an approach would likely politicize 
determinations of which regions qualify for the mandate, encouraging 
discrepancies in housing prices and perpetuating environmental justice 
concerns where the most disaster-prone regions are also the most 
affordable ones.220 Ultimately, as the risk gap closes with the 
intensifying nature of climate change, areas presently considered 
relatively low risk are unlikely to remain at that risk tier, and 
mandating protective measures now is inherently beneficial to this 
reality.  
A nationwide mandate will eliminate these concerns. It will allow 
for the creation of risk corridors, meaning low-risk homeowners will 
subsidize the costs of payouts in high-risk areas.221 With the ability to 
distribute their risks across state lines and into more low-risk regions, 
insurance companies will be in a stronger financial position to issue 
payouts in the wake of natural disasters without harming their 
 
 216. See supra notes 193–195 and accompanying text (outlining a process for precaution 
crediting under a disaster insurance mandate). 
 217. See discussion infra Part II.C.3 (analyzing the federalism implications of a federal 
intervention).  
 218. See WILENSKY & TEITELBAUM, supra note 54, at 156–62 (outlining the principles of 
health insurance and risk pools). 
 219. See supra notes 9–12 and accompanying text (discussing how natural disasters have 
transcended their traditional geographic barriers). 
 220. See Gustavo A. García-López, The Multiple Layers of Environmental Injustice in 
Contexts of (Un)natural Disasters: The Case of Puerto Rico Post-Hurricane Maria, 11 ENV’T JUST. 
101, 107 (2018) (analyzing the key socioeconomic drivers of environmental injustice in Puerto 
Rico post-Hurricane Maria and noting that many of those who live in high-risk storm paths are 
low income).  
 221. See Timothy J. Layton, Thomas G. McGuire & Anna D. Sinaiko, Risk Corridors and 
Reinsurance in Health Insurance Marketplaces: Insurance for Insurers, 2 AM. J. HEALTH ECON. 
66, 67 (2016) (“Risk corridors redistribute revenues from plans earning large profits to plans 
incurring large losses.”).  
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profitability due to the significant influx of money spurred by a national 
mandate. This, however, was the approach the ACA endeavored to 
undertake and formed the basis of many of the political attacks 
launched at the ACA.222 But, given the lower scale of a disaster 
insurance mandate223 relative to the individual mandate under the 
ACA,224 it is possible a disaster insurance mandate would dodge much 
of the political controversy that inhibited the ACA’s individual 
mandate.  
To further facilitate the proliferation of disaster insurance, the 
federal government should relax restrictions that have functionally 
discouraged insurance companies from operating across state lines.225 
This will also allow for the creation of risk corridors without forcing 
undue burdens upon homeowners, many of whom are already 
generally insured as required by their mortgage providers.226 This 
proposal implicates another key question: Should the federal 
government be able to set rates on insurance premiums and deny rate 
increases the way that state governments can? This would be an 
aggressive regulatory maneuver that would stir political controversy.227 
It would, however, standardize premiums and manage increases 
nationally, such that fluctuations in an insurer’s behavior in one state 
are not disruptive to another state.  
As it stands, there is no policy in place that properly protects 
homeowners from the increasing frequency of natural disasters. 
Existing hands-off approaches cost homeowners and insurance 
companies billions and exacerbate problems of underinsurance and 
 
 222. See supra notes 154–165 and accompanying text (discussing the “backlash” initially faced 
by the ACA and the individual mandate). 
 223. This means that, on the national scale, total losses due to natural disasters are in lower 
amounts than are total healthcare expenses.  
 224. See supra notes 14–18 and accompanying text (contextualizing the stakes of the 
homeowner insurance crisis with ACA-related statistics).  
 225. The ACA permits the sale of insurance across state lines, but this is subject to certain 
restrictions and as a result, no insurer has opted to do so. See JENN JENSON & TRISH RILEY, 
NAT’L ACAD. FOR STATE HEALTH POL’Y, SELLING HEALTH INSURANCE ACROSS STATE LINES 
2 (2017), https://www.nashp.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/02/Insurance-Across-State-Lines.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/V4UD-22G3] (“Because the ACA’s regulatory floor limits the impact of policy 
differences across states, insurers have less flexibility to exploit differences to create lower-cost 
products. In addition, federal requirements . . . may be viewed as burdensome extra steps for 
states and insurers.”). 
 226. See Flavelle, supra note 1 (stating that mortgage providers require their clients to 
purchase homeowner insurance). 
 227. See discussion supra Part II.C.3 (expounding upon the politicization of the ACA as an 
aggressive federal regulatory measure and describing the backlash it faced as a result).  
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housing shortages.228 By installing an individual mandate and funding 
a federal disaster insurance program, the federal government can build 
more resilient communities and allow individuals in the United States 
to continue to live wherever they wish. Continued inaction is to ignore 
the new reality of climate change and only perpetuate further losses. 
C.  The Legal Basis for an Individual Mandate 
This Section addresses the fundamental legal principles that 
underlie this Note’s proposal. First, it builds upon the analogy between 
this proposal and the ACA to conclude that an individual mandate 
related to disaster insurance would be a valid exercise of Congress’s 
taxing power. Next, it situates the proposal within existing tax policy to 
emphasize its minimally disruptive effect. Finally, it reflects on the 
federalism aspects of this proposal. 
1. The Proposal and the Taxing Power.  The proposed disaster 
insurance mandate should draw its structure from that found in the 
ACA. At the time of its passage, the ACA was hotly debated; yet, the 
ACA has so far managed to survive even the most impassioned attacks 
against it.229 Related legal battles, however, have resulted in key 
limitations being placed on Congress’s power to intervene in insurance 
markets. These limitations are intended to protect federalism by 
keeping the ACA within the purview of the Constitution.230 
Understanding these restraints informs a model federal intervention 
into the homeowner insurance market that avoids implicating 
constitutional concerns. The ACA and Sebelius confirm that if 
Congress were to implement a disaster insurance mandate as a tax on 
taking out a mortgage, it could do so as an established, proper use of 
its taxing power.231  
 
 228. See discussion supra Part I (characterizing the crisis facing homeowners). 
 229. The ACA has been upheld by the Supreme Court as recently as June 2021. California v. 
Texas, 141 S. Ct. 2104, 2112 (2021). For a thorough catalogue of the battles the ACA has faced 
over the years, see generally JONATHAN COHN, THE TEN YEAR WAR: OBAMACARE AND THE 
UNFINISHED CRUSADE FOR UNIVERSAL COVERAGE (2021) (cataloguing the history of the 
ACA, its impact, and the challenges it faced).  
 230. See generally Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012) (assessing 
concerns over the constitutionality of the ACA and the extent to which its provisions infringe 
upon states’ rights). 
 231. See discussion supra Part I.D.2 (explaining how the Court found the ACA’s individual 
mandate provision to be an appropriate use of Congress’s taxing power). The analysis in Sebelius 
suggests another path forward for a disaster insurance mandate—this time through the 
Commerce Clause. Unlike in Sebelius, wherein the Commerce Clause could not be utilized 
O'HARA IN PRINTER FINAL (DO NOT DELETE) 12/23/2021  9:45 AM 
980  DUKE LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 71:943 
Congressional exercise of its taxing power is the best path forward 
to mandating disaster insurance. Through the taxing power, Congress 
may ensure that any individual taking out a mortgage on a home would 
be subject to a tax if the individual could not show proof of disaster 
insurance.  
2. The Proposal and Existing Tax Policy.  Aspects of existing tax 
policy currently conflict with this proposal. Specifically, the federal 
government has expressed a consistent preference for encouraging 
homeownership by granting various tax benefits based on the 
possession of a mortgage.232 For example, Congress permits taxpayers 
to deduct portions of their mortgage interest payments in calculating 
their taxable income.233 This Note’s proposal, meanwhile, may be read 
to punish homeownership by penalizing a homeowner who takes out a 
mortgage without obtaining disaster insurance. In other words, 
attaching the tax to mortgages affects only those who must take out a 
mortgage to own a home, arguably contradicting policy preferences 
behind the existing tax framework. Those who do not have mortgages, 
whether they be wealthy or indigent, would not be subject to the 
mandate but would still have options available to them—these include 
purchasing of disaster insurance through a private insurer or taking 
advantage of programs like the National Flood Insurance Program, 
which may be better equipped to support enrollees of limited means 
when much of its current burden will shift under the mandate. But 
nothing in this proposal calls for existing tax rules and regulations to 
be reversed. Tax deductions for home mortgage interest payments may 
still be granted. Though this tax allowance remains contested,234 this 
 
because it would compel activity, 567 U.S. at 555, a disaster insurance mandate does regulate 
existing activity—either purchasing a home or taking out a mortgage—depending on how it is 
constructed. An individual is injecting themselves into the stream of commerce via this activity, 
and therefore their actions can be potentially regulated under the Commerce Clause.  
 232. For a summary of relevant pro-homeownership policies embedded in the Internal 
Revenue Code, see generally William G. Gale, Jonathan Gruber & Seth Stephens-Davidowitz, 
Encouraging Homeownership Through the Tax Code, BROOKINGS (June 18, 2007), https://
www.brookings.edu/wp-content/uploads/2016/07/20070618.pdf [https://perma.cc/E9T2-R3ZJ]. 
 233. I.R.C. § 163(h)(3). 
 234. Existing tax policy in this realm is subject to sharp criticism, primarily on the basis that it 
deprives renters of similar benefits, which can have the effect of widening racial and economic 
inequities. Daniel Teles & Christopher Davis, Tax Credits for Renters Could Increase Racial and 
Economic Equity, URB. INST.: URB. WIRE (Dec. 9, 2020), https://www.urban.org/urban-wire/tax-
credits-renters-could-increase-racial-and-economic-equity [https://perma.cc/D42N-MMZW]. 
Additionally, others have argued these policies do not so much encourage homeownership as they 
do encourage upper-class and upper-middle-class individuals to purchase more expensive homes. 
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proposal does not advocate for such mortgage-based policies to be 
upended merely to justify its existence.  
This proposal does, however, call for deviation from the policy 
rationale underlying these existing rules. In fact, pressing 
circumstances demand such deviation. The imminent severity of 
climate change has served as a basis for this proposal throughout, and 
it continues to do so here.235 Congress should apprise itself of the tools 
available to it and act as this Note establishes that it can.236 Further, 
there is little indication that this proposal, if passed, would lead to any 
meaningful decline in homeownership that could be said to represent 
a true rebuke of the federal government’s pro-homeownership policy. 
If anything, by signaling a commitment to protecting homes from 
natural disasters, Congress may encourage homeownership by 
augmenting the accessibility of disaster insurance—not unlike how the 
ACA’s healthcare insurance mandate encouraged individuals to 
engage with the healthcare system.237 The proposal is nevertheless at 
least facially anti-homeownership, but tax policies must confront 
reality: as climate change exacerbates the risks to U.S. livelihoods, 
Congress will increasingly develop mitigating strategies—and it may 
subsequently feel justified in tweaking its traditional approach. 
3. The Proposal and Federalism.  When it comes to federalism, 
insurance, and preexisting conditions in the healthcare context, there 
are other key dynamics in play. When states failed to effectively 
regulate health insurance, the ACA provided a federal response. 
Before the ACA, certain states were placed at clear disadvantages.238 
Mismanaged health insurance plans, when constructed on a piecemeal 
basis, not only harmed these states’ economies, but they also negatively 
impacted the health of residents and incentivized these states to make 
their health insurance markets inferior to those of their neighbors.239 
And states’ efforts to protect their residents from predatory insurers 
 
John Iselin & Philip Stallworth, Who Benefits from Tax Subsidies for Home Ownership?, TAX 
POL’Y CTR. (Sept. 14, 2016), https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/taxvox/who-benefits-tax-subsidies-
home-ownership [https://perma.cc/K7XM-4NY6].  
 235. See supra Introduction (establishing the necessity of change in light of the increasing 
severity and frequency of natural disasters due to climate change). 
 236. See supra Part II.C.1 (providing the constitutional basis upon which Congress can act).  
 237. See generally Freeman et al., supra note 179 (showing how participation in healthcare at 
earlier stages increased with possession of health insurance). 
 238. See Permut, supra note 178 (describing the distinct economic disadvantages faced by 
Delaware when it was left to regulate its own health insurance program). 
 239. See id. (same). 
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often backfired. For example, states attempted to establish statewide 
community rating and other forms of consumer protection.240 The 
result? Many insurers refused to sell in those states entirely.241 These 
states faced the same impasse that confronts California today; if states 
relaxed their consumer protection laws, insurers would raise their 
premiums beyond affordability.242 The ACA was a key stabilizer in the 
health insurance crisis, suggesting that where piecemeal state 
regulation fails, federal interventions are critical.243 
But solidarity is also an issue.244 Despite preexisting conditions 
providing a strong analogy to susceptibility to natural disasters, 
national solidarity has not historically existed in the context of natural 
disasters—there have always been states that are far more vulnerable 
to natural disasters than others.245 This could provide a compelling 
argument for maintaining state-specific homeowner insurance 
regulations. The lack of solidarity, however, does not capture the full 
scope of the issue. This is especially true as climate change intensifies 
abnormal weather patterns, increasing the vulnerability of states not 
previously associated with adverse natural events.246  
The same principles used to constitutionally rationalize the ACA 
and its protection of individuals with preexisting conditions should be 
used to justify a federal intervention into the homeowner insurance 
market on behalf of disaster-prone homes and homeowners. A 
mandate for U.S. homeowners can be constructed and protected under 
 
 240. BRADLEY HERRING & MARK V. PAULY, NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. RSCH., THE EFFECT 
OF STATE COMMUNITY RATING REGULATIONS ON PREMIUMS AND COVERAGE IN THE 
INDIVIDUAL HEALTH INSURANCE MARKET 13–14 (2006), https://aspe.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/
private/pdf/75071/HIMregs.pdf [https://perma.cc/W7FZ-387P]. 
 241. LEIGH WACHENHEIM & HANS LEIDA, THE IMPACT OF GUARANTEED ISSUE AND 
COMMUNITY RATING REFORMS ON STATES’ INDIVIDUAL INSURANCE MARKETS 2 (2012), http:/
/www.statecoverage.org/files/Updated-Milliman-Report_GI_and_Comm_Rating_March_
2012.pdf [https://perma.cc/HQ9S-YLJK] (concluding that insurance markets “deteriorated after 
the introduction of . . . [community rating],” noting that “insurance companies chose to stop 
selling individual insurance in the market after [community rating was] enacted”).  
 242. See Flavelle, supra note 1 (describing the insurance availability crisis in California).  
 243. See discussion supra notes 238–242 (describing the role of the ACA in overcoming 
problems associated with a state-by-state approach to insurance regulation).  
 244. See Carol C. Gould, Solidarity and the Problem of Structural Injustice in Healthcare, 32 
BIOETHICS 541, 541 (2018) (“[H]uman solidarity . . . proposes attention to the health of distant 
others, as a condition of their dignity.”).  
 245. See supra note 50 and accompanying text (discussing how natural disasters, unlike 
adverse health outcomes, have been historically associated with specific geographic regions).  
 246. See supra notes 9–12 and accompanying text (providing evidence for the increased 
frequency and severity of natural disasters in regions previously unaffected). 
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Sebelius.247 This nationwide mandate will ultimately reduce piecemeal 
approaches to homeowner insurance regulation and create a federal 
floor for covering homes after the natural disasters that states will 
increasingly and inevitably face. 
CONCLUSION 
Natural disasters are increasing in frequency and severity, and 
neither the federal government nor states have kept up with this 
reality. Homeowners face untold losses, and they are often profoundly 
underinsured for disaster-induced losses. Furthermore, insurance 
companies refuse to insure homes where natural disasters are common, 
exacerbating a growing housing crisis. It thus is imperative that the 
federal government intervene by establishing a permanent legislative 
scheme whereby insurance against natural disasters is mandated and 
affordably priced. The federal government is the only entity able to 
subsidize the costs of such a scheme, given the lack of profitability for 
insurance companies and the restrictive budgeting requirements faced 
by the states. The federal government is constitutionally empowered 
to undertake this objective, and millions of individuals across the 
United States depend upon it doing so.  
 
 
 247. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 574 (2012) (“The Affordable 
Care Act’s requirement that certain individuals pay a financial penalty for not obtaining health 
insurance may reasonably be characterized as a tax.”).  
